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ROTH AT FIFTY: RECONSIDERING THE
COMMON LAW ANTECEDENTS OF
AMERICAN OBSCENITY DOCTRINE
JAMES R. ALEXANDER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past fifty years, Justice Brennan's dictum in Roth v.
United States1 has directed both the structure and the substance of
American obscenity law which, upon reflection, made even
Brennan himself quite uneasy.2 The Roth test, against which all
subsequent court decisions were measured, stated that materials
were obscene if "to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest."3 It was a standard
Brennan identified as already established by prior court decisions4
*

Professor, University of Pittsburgh, Johnstown.

1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

2. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). After ten years, Brennan had apparently despaired at the
prospect of a workable definition of obscenity that did not allow suppression of
socially valuable ideas. David L. Hudson, Jr., Is Anything Obscene Anymore?
Justice Brennan's "Significant Departure"and Warning of an "Evisceration,"
10 NEXUS 93, 95 (2005). The exact same concern was expressed by Lord
Campbell when he proposed the 1857 Obscene Publications Act in England, as
discussed below. See M. J.D. Roberts, Morals, Art, and the Law: The Passing
of the Obscene PublicationsAct of 1857, 28 VICT. STUD. 609 (1985) (discussing
the parliamentary debates surrounding the Act).
3. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Roth test became the foundation of the
three-pronged Memoirs test of whether "(a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman's Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 418 (1966) [hereinafter Memoirs].
4. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489; see also Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729
(1940) (noting that the work as a whole must be interpreted in its own time
and circumstances); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (1930) (determining
that the use of the materials must be measured against the purpose of the
statute); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (1933)
[hereinafter Ulysses I] (noting that interpretation of the work as a whole can
determine the author's purpose); United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157-58
(1936) (finding that the jury must weigh the merits of the work against its
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and one that explicitly rejected the earlier leading standard of R.
v. Hicklin.5 Hicklin provided that material should be "judged
merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly
susceptible persons."6
The Roth test became the prevailing
statement of legal doctrine for obscenity cases, exerting controlling
authority because courts had acceded to and utilized it as such
and, inadvertently or not, thereby enhanced it.'
defects, and not necessarily "yielding to the most susceptible mind"); Walker v.
Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (1945) (noting that "the dominant effect of the
entire publication determines its character," citing Parmalee, Ulysses I, and
Levine); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 557 (1945) (finding that
even in a work of literary merit, obscene content can pervade to such a degree
"as to give to the whole a licentious quality calculated to produce harm which
the statute is intended to prevent"). This line of doctrinal development is
described in detail in William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature,
the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954).
5. (1868) 3 L.R.Q.B. 360.
6. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89. As will be shown below, this is hardly a
complete or even accurate portrayal of the Hicklin standard. When initially
adopted by American courts in United States v. Bennett, 24 F.Cas. 1093, 1102
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571), the Hicklin standard was that materials
were judged obscene if they tended "to deprave and corrupt the morals of those
whose minds are open to such influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall." For example, obscene materials would "do mischief to
the minds of those to whom such questions are addressed, by suggesting
thoughts and desires which otherwise would not have occurred to their
minds." Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 371. The Hicklin precedent was applied in
several subsequent American cases as supporting criminal scrutiny of the
corrupting effect of materials as gauged by the tendency of isolated passages
rather than the work as a whole, precluding consideration of the author's
purpose, the actual effect on respective audiences, or any collateral positive
societal benefit that may result. Bennett, 24 F.Cas. at 1102; United States v.
Clarke, 38 F. 732, 736 (1889); United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1913). As a precedent case, Hicklin has been read as precluding
consideration of the author's or publisher's intention in favor of relying on a
jury's anticipation of the harmful effect (tendency) on the minds of those likely
to be exposed to the materials. This interpretation also overstates the Hicklin
decision which, in English common law, would not have precluded
consideration of intent. See Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 373 (discussing the
intention of an author in publishing an obscene work).
7. The presumption here is that Roth established the fundamental
structure of review for all subsequent obscenity cases which was then
implemented in Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418. It was also a decidedly contentneutral decision, in that the Court did not address whether the materials were
obscene. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 n.8. It has been argued that the principal
arguments underlying the Roth test were undermined by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and as many as five distinct definitions of
obscenity have been offered by the Court between Roth and Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (stating
materials are obscene if: (a) they appeal to prurient interest in sex when taken
as a whole and judged by contemporary community standards from the
perspective of the average person; (b) are patently offensive in their display of
sexual conduct; and (c) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value). All of these definitions are variations of the Roth doctrinal structure
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Brennan substantiated his conclusion by a sequence of points
he portrayed as placing obscene materials outside the
constitutionally protected areas of speech and press under the
First Amendment: first, that the constitutional intention was not
that all utterances were to be protected because libelous
utterances were not protected;8 second, that whereas obscenity law
was not as fully developed as libel law, there was sufficient
evidence in the case law that obscenity was beyond intended
protection; 9 and third, that all ideas having the slightest
redeeming social importance were accorded full protection unless
excludable because they encroached on more important interests.10
Obscenity was, by definition, "utterly without redeeming social
importance. " "
and none reaches for an operative definition supportable under due process.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and the Freedom of Speech: A First
Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1343-44 (1991) (explaining
Brennan's attempt to provide a better, more protective way to analyze First
Amendment issues).
8. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266
(1952)). As stated above, as the reach of protected speech evolved in case law,
Justice Brennan himself ultimately undermined this argument in Sullivan,
finding that original intent did provide basic constitutional protection for
libelous utterances against public officials unless knowingly false and
maliciously made. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
9. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (citing Knowles v. Connecticut, 3 Day 103 (Conn.
1808); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821); and Commonwealth v.
Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815)). It is difficult to discern whether
Justice Brennan was differentiating obscenity law (yet undeveloped) from libel
law (already developed) or identifying obscenity law as an undeveloped subset
within libel law. As will be shown, the latter is the appropriate classification.
10. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
11. Id. at 484-85 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 57172 (1942). Chaplinsky's identification of categories of speech outside First
Amendment protection, widely cited as definitive within the doctrine of
obscenity law, was also dictum. 315 U.S. at 571-72. The creation of such a
category without differentiating standards presented obvious dilemmas in
discerning inclusiveness beyond jurisprudential intuition, such as Justice
Stewart's summative "I know it when I see it," Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), an admission that the definition of
obscenity, if not its status under First Amendment guarantees, was an
unsettled area of law. Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE
L. J. 1023, 1026 (1996). From Roth's reading of the previous cases (supranote
4), one would presume the category included those expressions that did not
contribute social value to public discourse, the parameters of which began to
dissolve with the emergence of mass culture and mass literacy in the midnineteenth century.
See, e.g., ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF
RETICENCE: AMERICA'S CULTURAL AND LEGAL STRUGGLES OVER FREE SPEECH,
OBSCENITY, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART (Hill and Wang 1996)

(detailing the evolution of traditionally private matters into the public sphere
and how obscenity affected that development). See also three texts on
contemporaneous social dynamics in England: ALLISON PEASE, MODERNISM,
MASS CULTURE, AND THE AESTHETICS OF OBSCENITY (Cambridge U. Press

2000) (analyzing famous authors' works from the eighteenth through
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The fact that doctrines of American obscenity law are
currently in a quandary is not surprising. If we assume that
obscene materials are not protected under First Amendment
guarantees as a matter of definition, the principal constitutional
question becomes how we can, with due process, differentiate the
obscene from the non-obscene, after which we still face the
inevitable questions of exceptions and marginal calls. 2 The initial
judicial effort to state a workable standard in the American courts
was in United States v. Bennett, 3 which drew directly from the
language of Hicklin with little examination of its historical legal
context or the principles of common law on which it was based. 4
twentieth centuries demonstrating the categorical progression of sexually
explicit works from pornography to art); THOMAS RICHARDS, THE COMMODITY
CULTURE OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND: ADVERTISING AND SPECTACLE, 1851-1914
(Stan. U. Press 1990) (detailing the "new commodity culture" of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries and how that culture was driven by
advertising); and LISA Z. SIGEL, GOVERNING PLEASURES: PORNOGRAPHY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1815-1914 (Rutgers U. Press 2002) (discussing
the evolution of pornography and the reasons for its progression).
12. These questions always arise when materials that have arguably
obscene content also include political argument or artistic or literary
expression, and courts become ensnared in attempts to differentiate 'level[s] of
protection' to certain forms of expression. See, e.g., Steven Heyman, Spheres
of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence,10 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 705-06 (2002) (discussing the
conflict in First Amendment jurisprudence surrounding content-neutrality
and distinguishing speech that should be regulated only when it invades the
rights of others). Inevitably these considerations become more complex and
perhaps insoluble when juries are asked to apply the "average person applying
contemporary community standards" test to expression that contains elements
of transgressive sexual (prurient) interest, or to consider waiving the test
altogether in areas in which imminent harm can only be intuited, such as in
child pornography cases. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; see Amy Adler, Inverting the
FirstAmendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 923 (2001) (noting that "subversive
advocacy cases concerned core political First Amendment speech, whereas
child pornography law is about 'sordid' sexual cravings"); and Amy Adler, The
Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001)
(questioning the parallels between the growth of child pornography law and
the increase in child sexual abuse). These considerations also extend to
whether violence as an expressive mode exacerbates societal harms in certain
areas of conduct (e.g. sexual) or with regard to certain groups (such as
children), and warrants diminished constitutional protection. See KEVIN W.
SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING THE MEDIA'S FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION (Duke U. Press 1996) (discussing violence in the
media in connection with obscenity and the First Amendment) and, more
recently, his SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT (N.Y.U.
Press 2003) (examining different kinds of speech - from obscenity to hate
speech - and the consideration of children when it comes to the First
Amendment).
13. 24 F.Cas. at 1102.
14. Infra notes 86-97. As Roth became recognized as guiding obscenity
doctrine by its reference and elaboration in Memoirs, so also did Hicklin only
become recognized in English common law doctrine by its direct quotation in
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Since that point, courts have gingerly handled the inevitable
central questions of tendency (largely in the context of an assumed
decline in the moral discipline of society) and effect (including
debates over the definition of serious literary or artistic merit)
without much wholesale change in the basic elements of the
regime.15
But what exactly are the basic elements of the regime? The
courts seemed so relieved to be rid of common law precedent in
their cautious navigation among statutory challenges that they too
often did not pause long enough to investigate the legal history
and the common law foundations of Hicklin. If they had, they may
have been less sanguine about how far we have traveled
doctrinally from Hicklin and more thoughtful about the structure
of common law and how it sought to balance factors in much the
same manner as jurisprudential regimes today.
Obscenity per se is not a crime; it is the publication of
obscenity that renders it criminal. Publication alone, not content,
brings obscenity under the criminal law of libel. The dilemma of
who shall decide what is sufficiently obscene to constitute a
criminal offense, as well as the standard to be adopted when
making that decision, remain problematic.
However, if we
recognize that the core element of the crime is in the publication
itself, then we can fruitfully explore the common law antecedents
to American obscenity law doctrines.
II.

THE OFFENSE OF OBSCENE LIBEL AT COMMON LAW

Temporal crimes regarding obscenity, especially those
concerning sexuality, are of fairly recent origin in English common
law and, one might argue, were precipitated as incremental
expansions of nuisance law into the broader realm of public
morality. Questions of moral behavior were traditionally the
province of ecclesiastical courts, but the statutory reduction in
their criminal jurisdiction and the relative absence of gradations of
workable sanctions (beyond, for example, excommunication)
Steele v. Brannan, 7 L.P.C.P. 261 (1872), and subsequently in American law in
Bennett, 24 F.Cas. at 1104.
15. While the basic elements of the regime remain fairly constant, there
has been little agreement on how each can be defined or how each should be
weighted in particular cases, as demonstrated most radically in Jacobellis, in
which the only plurality agreement gained on substantive argument was two
justices. 378 U.S. at 185. On the constellation of elements in basic obscenity
cases, see generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1960) (examining the Supreme Court's
decisions from the late 1950s regarding the constitutionality of legislation that
made obscenity a crime); and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (looking at the content-

based and content-neutral distinction in First Amendment analysis and the
role "communicative impact" plays regarding content-based restrictions).
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reduced those courts' effectiveness in regulating morality. By that
point, the regulation of moral behavior was already being absorbed
under the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber and later the new
Court of the King's Bench as misdemeanors against public order at
common law - in effect differentiating between sinful and criminal
behavior. 6 In large part, this expansion came in two areas: public
nuisance law and laws of defamation. The latter (manifest as
slander and libel) related to public statements that vilified an
individual and brought him into ridicule or hatred, both generally
regarded as tending to threaten public order because he, or his
relatives and friends, would be inclined to seek revenge and resort
to breaches of the peace that could not be avoided by normal
enforcement of laws.
Over time, the court extended the
misdemeanor of libel to cover critical or contemptuous statements
regarding the government (as political and seditious libel), religion
and elements of faith (as blasphemous libel), and public expression
or conduct that challenged or threatened public morality (as
obscene libel).' 7
A. Temporal Offenses Contra Bonos Mores
In 1663, the regulation of immoral behavior was brought
irreversibly under jurisdiction of the King's Bench in R. v. Sedley,"
16. The standard and most comprehensive works on this development at
common law are GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, OBSCENITY: AN ACCOUNT OF
CENSORSHIP LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES

(Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1979) (considering obscenity's definition, the rise of
obscenity law, pornography in the marketplace, and media censorship);
NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEvAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW, (Secker & Warburg

1956) (discussing the history of obscenity, the rise of obscenity law, and
various countries' approaches to obscenity), supplemented by three articles by
Colin Manchester: Lord Campbell's Act: England'sFirst Obscenity Statute, 9 J.
LEGAL HIST. 223 (1988) [hereinafter Lord Campbell's Act] (discussing the
opposition to the Obscene Publications Act of 1857 because of its potential
overbreadth); Obscenity Law Enforcement in the Nineteenth Century, 2 J.
LEGAL HIST. 45 (1981) [hereinafter Obscenity Law Enforcement] (detailing the
efforts of private bodies and the authorities in their enforcement of obscenity
law and how little seemed to have changed by the century's end); and A
History of the Crime of Obscene Libel, 12 J. LEGAL HIST. 36 (1991) [hereinafter
History of the Crime] (following obscene libel's development in England,
including the offense's background and elements). Other useful sources on the
history of obscenity law in England include: ALEC CRAIG, THE BANNED BOOKS
OF ENGLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES: A STUDY OF THE CONCEPTION OF

LITERARY OBSCENITY (Allen & Unwin 1962) (considering literary obscenity's
conception and its negative effects upon serious literature and intellectual
freedom generally); DONALD THOMAS, A LONG TIME BURNING: THE HISTORY
OF LITERARY CENSORSHIP IN ENGLAND (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969)

(attempting, in part, to formulate the proper definition of "pornography"); IAN
HUNTER, DAVID SAUNDERS, AND DUGALD WILLIAMSON, ON PORNOGRAPHY:
LITERATURE, SEXUALITY AND OBSCENITY LAW 57-91 (St. Martin's Press 1993).

17. Supra note 16.
18. Initially cited as R. v. Sidley, (1663) 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B.), derived
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a case involving lewd public conduct in which the court summarily
declared its jurisdiction as the custos morum of the King's subjects9
over conduct threatening public morality (contra bonos mores).
Based on the principle that its civil authority reached moral
behavior and its consequences, the court progressively broadened
its consideration of immoral conduct beyond incidents of
outrageous public behavior (traditionally prosecuted as public
nuisances at common law) into areas of more permanent
expression as matters of libel.20 The Court maintained that public
expression could be considered a criminal offense if it tended to
corrupt the morals of the King's subjects, despite the absence of
demonstrable injury to a specific individual (as would be required
from two separate nominate reports: Le Roy v. Sr. Charles Sidley (1663) 1 Sid.
168 and Sir Charles Sydlyes Case (1663) 1 KEB. 620. The defendant, Sir
Charles Sedley (1639-1701), would later become a renowned minor British
poet, lyricist, and comedy playright, infrequently referred to as Sidley, but by
the 1670s, the spelling in publication (and based on his signatures) had settled
on Sedley. Court records subsequently corrected the spelling to Sedley in Curll
(infra note 22), to which all primary and secondary legal sources have adhered
since that time. Here and hereafter referred to as Sedley.
19. While custos morum (guardianship of morals) was claimed
jurisdictionally by the Court at Kings Bench in Sedley, id., it was referenced
as appropriate jurisdiction in passing in earlier cases, e.g. James Bagg's Case,
(1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B.) (considering public words and gestures of
contempt as contra bonos mores and worthy of punishment but not
disfranchisement without due "course of law"). Even after Sedley, it is difficult
to ascertain the type of behavior that would in subsequent application be
considered a threat to public order, since the offending behavior in Sedley
included raucous, blasphemous shoutings from a balcony of a public house,
public exhibition of nakedness, and casting bottles of urine on passersby
below. Any/all of these actions may have caused crowds to storm the public
house demanding some form of retribution.
See Leo Alpert, Judicial
Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REv. 40, 41-43 (1938) (stating
that blasphemous expression and public lewdness had not yet been firmly
established as offenses under public nuisance law, public urination was easily
a nuisance, and the crowd reaction - as reported in apparently some
exaggeration (infra note 22) - demonstrated some degree to which public order
was threatened). See generally Offences Contra Bonos Mores, 2 J. C. L. 609
(1938) (discussing contra bonos mores in general and detailing specific cases
for illustration).
20. Whether the offense in Sedley was moral-based or merely a public
nuisance was critical to the determination of the range of the Court's custos
morum jurisdiction. In R. v. Read, (1748) 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (K.B.), the Court
continued to adhere to traditional ecclesiastical (rather than temporal)
jurisdiction over the morality of public expression, arguing that there were no
statutory laws under which it could punish the behavior at issue, no common
law decisions to guide its consideration of principles, and no specification of
individuals (or alternatively the Crown or the government, as in seditious
expression) against whom a defaming libel may have been committed. Id. To
reach that conclusion, the Court in Read narrowly interpreted Sedley as a
simple case of a public nuisance (albeit with moral overtones) and was the last
major case in which the Court refused to accept jurisdiction over moral-based
behavior at common law. Id.
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under the civil laws of libel) and/or specific evidence of a breach of
21
peace.
First enunciated in Curil in 1727,22 the criminal offense of
obscene libel was explicitly recognized as a temporal offense
because it involved impious behavior or expression that would
tend to cause a breach of peace by challenging religion, thereby
weakening the bonds of civil society, virtue, and morality. 3 By
equating public order with public morality, Curll doctrinally
defined Sedley as bringing all issues of public morality under
temporal law and expanded the temporal jurisdiction of libel law
beyond public writings or expressions ("utterings") to include
publications in general, including the written word and pictorial
depictions. 24 The newly created criminal offense at common law
was therefore an amalgam of impiety in expression or conduct and
a tendency toward a breach of peace, which had little to do with
either licentious behavior or writings per se.2" Subsequent court
21. Sedley, supra note 18.
22. R. v. Curll, (1727) 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B.). The State Trials record of
Curll includes detailed recorder notes on both Read and Sedley, including
some skepticism about the degree of crowd anger in response to Sedley's
actions. (1727) 17 St. Trials 154, 155, 157-58.
23. Curll, 93 Eng. Rep. at 851. This becomes dictum in R. v. Rogier and
Humphrey, (1823) 107 Eng. Rep. 102 (K.B.) (finding court jurisdiction over any
practice that tends to injure public morals, and the basis of all cases of obscene
libel at common law until the passage of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959,
7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66 (Eng.). See generally RALPH STRAUS, THE UNSPEAKABLE
CURLL, BOOKSELLER (London 1927); ST. JOHN-STEVAs, supra note 16, at 22-25
(discussing the recognition of obscene libel at common law); THOMAS, supra
note 16, at 78-85 (detailing Curll's professional undertakings - questionable
literary publications - and the famous case in which a unanimous verdict was
entered against him); CRAIG, supra note 16, at 26-32 (discussing Edmund
Curll and his interactions with authors as well as his case's importance
regarding obscene libel); History of the Crime, supra note 16, at 38-40 (noting
the development of obscene libel by discussing Curll and how Curll himself
had little chance of acquittal).
24. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. at 851.
25. Initially, the Court still relied on arguments founded on the tendency of
injured parties to seek retribution (thus anticipating a breach of peace) as
stated in R. v. Topham, (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 931, 932 (K.B.) ("[tihe chief cause
for which the law so severely punishes all offenses of this nature is the direct
tendency of them to a breach of the public peace. . . ."). Later, the Court relied
more generally on determinations of broadly defined immoral tendencies that
weakened the bonds of civil society rather than findings of clear or imminent
breaches of the peace. By common practice however, the jurisdictions of the
spiritual and temporal were still considered exclusive and, at common law,
crimes involving immorality alone could not find their way into the temporal
courts without an explicit accompanying temporal offense or aspect. See, e.g.,
R. v. Crunden, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1091 (lewd exposure on a beach that could
be seen from nearby row houses); R. v. Holmes, (1853) 169 Eng. Rep. 697
(lewdness exhibited on a public omnibus); R. v. Delaval, (1763) 97 Eng. Rep.
913 (conspiracy to place an eighteen year old girl into prostitution); R. v.
Mears and Chalk, (1851) 169 Eng. Rep. 426 (public conspiracy to seduce a girl
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decisions increasingly relied on a broader and more generalized
definition of immoral expression, including licentious behavior or
writings that portended no particular tendency toward breaches of
peace other
than generally being "calculated to undermine public
2
morality." 1
By the mid-nineteenth century, obscene materials, however
loosely referenced to conventions of piety, became subject to
criminal prosecution if they were in some permanent fashion
presented in public ("published"). Such prosecutions could be, and
most often were, initiated at common law by offended private
parties.27
By this time, the Court had already accepted a
broadened definition of when materials could be considered
published, moving beyond the initial and obviously explicit action

into prostitution). In many cases, immoral (or obscene) behavior was
considered insufficiently criminal (e.g. prostitution itself not being an
indictable offense) unless it took place or was the subject of public utterance in
public and/or was assumed to cause public harm (ad commune nocumentum)
or an outrage to common decency that went beyond that of a incidental
nuisance (as would blatant solicitation of prostitution in public places).
26. By the more secularized nineteenth century, the prosecution of immoral
behavior reached beyond violations of traditional religious norms - primarily
disrespect for religion and religious institutions (as exhibited by blasphemous
comments or writings) and contempt for the sanctity of marriage (as exhibited
by licentious or obscene behavior) - to embrace broader behavioral
conventions of public decency and decorum associated with the emerging
middle class. See, e.g., R. v. Saunders and Hitchcock, (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 15, 17
(prosecution of crude language used to lure patrons into an exhibit); Worth v.
Terrington, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. 328, 333 (finding that the indecency of public
utterings was dependent on their circumstances rather than simply their
indecency per se); R. v. Grey, (1864) 176 Eng. Rep. 472, 473 (public display of a
diseased corpse considered disgusting and a public nuisance, yet not immoral);
and R. v. Elliot and White, (1861) 169 Eng. Rep. 1322 (sexual intercourse in a
public place was considered an outrage to public decency).
27. See Obscenity Law Enforcement, supra note 16, at 46-52 (detailing the
"Society for Suppression of Vice and the Encouragement of Religion and
Virtue" and how it dealt with prosecutions of obscene materials); Lord
Campbell's Act, supra note 16, at 224-29 (considering the Proclamation
Society's efforts in dealing with obscene libel and how the "Vice Society"
superceded it to carry on prosecutions); History of the Crime, supra note 16, at
40-44 (noting the significant role the Proclamation Society, and later the "Vice
Society," played in instituting obscene libel prosecutions). The most active
among organized efforts to initiate obscenity indictments in the first half of
the nineteenth century was the Society for the Suppression of Vice. M.J.D.
Roberts, Making Victorian Morals? The Society for the Suppression of Vice and
Its Critics, 1802-1886, 21 HIST. STUD. 157 (1984); see also ST. JOHN-STEvAS,
supra note 16, at 34-38 (discussing the "Vice Societies" and the fact that many
prosecutions were brought and many convictions resulted). The operative
difference in defamation law between slander and libel was that the former
was expressed in spoken words within the immediate hearing of the incident
audience and the latter was expressed in writing, a mode of expression that
expanded the potential audience both geographically and temporally, creating
an "effect" long after their first appearance.
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of printing materials for sale28 and encompassing related actions,
such as showing the materials to a potential customer" or
displaying them in a shop window, and interactions between
authors, artists, and publishers indicating their intent to sell their
work through the publisher. These actions, in turn, rendered
legally vulnerable those who engaged in literary or artistic
expression and made their work available to others in any
context."0
During that same period, the Court accepted as
publications subject to the law of obscene libel not only books and
pamphlets, but 'also magazines, newspapers, pictures, prints,
etchings, and other forms of graphic presentation.
The incorporation of the moral crimes of blasphemy and
obscenity into the criminal jurisdiction of libel at common law
became solidified into a jurisprudential regime in the nineteenth
century. Indictments for crimes of blasphemous libel were initially
prosecuted against public expressions of speech or conduct as
disrespect for the institution and basic doctrines of religion or as
publications that challenged the moral authority of religion as the

28. Seminal cases of writings prosecuted as blasphemous and/or obscene
libel include: R. v. Hill, (1698) 2 Strang. 790 (Rochester's POEMS ON SEVERAL
OCCASIONS); Read, .92 Eng. Rep. at 777 (THE FIFTEEN PLAGUES OF THE
MAIDENHEAD); Curil, 93 Eng. Rep. at 849 (THE NUN IN HER SMOCK); R. v.
Williams, (1797) 26 St. Trials 653 (Thomas Paine's THE AGE OF REASON) and
R. v. Richard Carlile, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 621 (also Paine's THE AGE OF
REASON); R. v. Moxon, (1841) 4 St. Trials 693 (Shelley's poem "Queen Mab");
Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 360 (THE CONFESSIONAL UNMASKED); R. v. Bradlaugh
and Besant, (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 569 (Knowlton's FRUITS OF PHILOSOPHY). Also
included were cases prosecuted against publication of transcripts of libel cases
in which the materials challenged as obscene or impious were read aloud into
the court record in their entirety. See, e.g., R. v. Mary Carlile, (1821) 106 Eng.
Rep. 624 (transcript of the trial of Richard Carlile); Steele v. Brannan, 7
L.R.C.P. at 261 (transcript of the trial of George Mackey in 1870, with
augmentation, regarding seizure of THE CONFESSIONAL UNMASKED).
Ironically, the profitable practice of publishing court reports of salacious and
scandalous trials was well-established by the eighteenth century, honed to a
fine practice by Edmund Curll. See Peter Wagner, The Pornographerin the
Courtroom: Trial Reports About Cases of Sexual Crimes and Delinquencies as
a Genre of Eighteenth-Century Erotica, in SEXUALITY IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY BRITAIN 120-40 (P. Bouce, ed., Manchester 1982) (explaining how
partly pornographic and obscene literature were being published as legal and
scientific documents).
29. See R. v. Rosenstein, (1826) 172 Eng. Rep. 187 (involving indecently
illustrated snuff boxes); R. v. Alfred Carlile, (1845) 1 Cox C.C. 229 (involving a
potential purchaser requesting and being shown indecent items possibly for
sale).
30. See, e.g., Wilkes v. R., (1769) 2 Eng. Rep. 244 (private printing of a
poem was still considered publication, despite the fact that there was no
explicit intent to distribute it to the public, because the simple act of placing
the materials into a publisher's hands indicated an intent to publish - or
render in published form - regardless of intent to distribute).
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foundation of the State.3' By the 1840s, in part reflecting the
secularist movement and challenges to traditional norms by
industrialization and democratization, blasphemous conduct and
expression gradually embraced a more cultural and literary (and
less doctrinal) definition of immorality, and its prosecution became
a benchmark statement of a desire to maintain cultural mores
rather than protections of the Church.32 Similarly, indictments for
31. By the mid-nineteenth century, the temporal offense of blasphemy was
specified by the definitive legal treatise of the time as the publication of
"profane words vilifying or ridiculing God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the
Old or New Testament, or Christianity in general, with intent to corrupt the
public morals, to shock and insult believers, or to bring the established
religion into hatred and contempt." W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW
OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 394 (Melville M. Bigelow, ed., Little, Brown 1881)
(amplifying the preceding classic treatise THOMAS STARKIE, LAW OF SLANDER,
LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMORS 326 (Collins and Hannay

1832) American reprint of the 1821 edition, which argued that "[i]t is now fully
established, that any immodest and immoral publication, tending to corrupt
the mind, and to destroy the love of decency, morality, and good order, is
punishable in the temporal Courts"). That argument was considered a direct
challenge to temporal authority as initially enunciated in Justice Hale's
dictum "Christianity is part and parcel of the law of England." R. v. Taylor,
(1676) 93 Eng. Rep. 882. This was reaffirmed inR. v. Woolston, (1729) 93 Eng.
Rep. 881, but clarified to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity rather
than simply differences of opinion. Authors were at liberty to temperately
express sincere opinions regarding religion and to seek truth on religious
matters if, in the course of doing so, they showed "proper respect to the
religion and government of the country." R. v. Burdett, (1820) 106 Eng. Rep.
873, 887; R. v. Hetherington, (1840) 4 St. Trials (N.S.) 563. See Courtney
Kenny, The Evolution of the Law of Blasphemy, 1 C. L. J. 127, 128-34 (1922)
(noting that at one point, just to express disbelief in Christianity was to
commit criminal blasphemy).
32. See, e.g., Atwood's Case, (1791) 79 Eng. Rep. 359 (blasphemous
disrespect of clergy in public); Williams, 26 St. Trials at 656 (publication of
Paine's THE AGE OF REASON considered prima facie blasphemous as
irreverent); R. v. Gathercole, (1838) 168 Eng. Rep. 1140 (finding criminal
blasphemy only required attacks against religion in general rather than a
specific religious doctrine or a specific church or denomination); Hetherington,
4 St. Trials at 596 (blasphemous attitudes reflected in the non-literal
interpretation of the Old Testament); Moxon, 4 St. Trials at 694 (publication of
unexpurgated version of Shelley's poem "Queen Mab" expressing youthful
exasperation with God); Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 360 (publication of antiCatholic pamphlet); and later less restrictively circumscribed in R. v. Ramsay
and Foote, (1883) 15 Cox C.C. 251 (finding that criminal blasphemy required
willful intent to subvert religious values rather than mere discussion of
religious issues). The final step in the progression from religious to cultural
regulation of expression came with the statutory removal of all defamation
cases from ecclesiastical courts to the jurisdiction of the King's Bench in 1855.
See JOSS MARSH, WORD CRIMES: BLASPHEMY, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 208-15 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998)

(discussing the use of religion, particularly, the Bible, in a way to suggest it
was obscene); S. M. WADDAMS, SEXUAL SLANDER IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND: DEFAMATION IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, 1815-1855 13 (Univ.

of Toronto Press 2000) (noting that attempts were made to reform different
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obscene libel, initially prosecuted as statements considered
offensive to religious-based mores, likewise gravitated toward
more secular definitions of acceptable cultural mores and began
focusing on topics regarding sexuality. 3
During this period, it was often difficult to differentiate
between an expression that was considered threatening to public
morality in general and an expression that simply outraged norms
of public decency; and would normally be prosecuted as a public
nuisance at common law. 34 To a large degree, the emerging legal
regime reflected the cultural, economic, social, and political

areas of the ecclesiastical courts, but that defamation was the first area of
their jurisdiction to be fundamentally reformed).
See generally R. B.
Outhwaite, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS,
1500-1860 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
33. One of the most complex cases in this regard was Bradlaugh and
Besant, in which the plaintiffs were prosecuted for cheap publication and
distribution of copies of Charles Knowlton's FRUITS OF PHILOSOPHY, a tract
containing birth control information that prosecutors claimed would encourage
wanton behavior by married and unmarried couples and plaintiffs argued
would actually strengthen marriage bonds, encourage the marriage state by
reducing the social and economic stress of uncontrolled conception, and protect
the health of women and children. 2 Q.B.D. at 569. The transcript of the
appeals trials was initially published as THE QUEEN V. CHARLES BRADLAUGH
AND ANNIE BESANT (Freethought Publishing 1877), and later in edited version
in ROGER MANVELL, THE TRIAL OF ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH
(Horizon Press 1977); see also ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 16, at 70-74
(explaining that the prosecution of the Besant-Bradlaugh case represented a
new type of prosecution for the publication of "sex manuals").
34. See, e.g., Sedley, supra note 22 (lewd behavior); Herring v. Walround,
(1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 870 (public exhibition of deformed children); R. v.
Wiseman, (1718) 92 Eng. Rep. 774 (sodomy); R. v. Gallard, (1733) 25 Eng. Rep.
547 (naked 'in a common way' not per se contra bonos mores); R. v. Lynn,
(1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (disinterring a buried corpse, as burial considered a
public function); Crunden, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1091 (public exhibitionism);
Worth, 153 Eng. Rep. at 333 (indecent utterings in public); Mears and Chalk,
169 Eng. Rep. at 426 (encouraging prostitution); Holmes, 169 Eng. Rep. 697
(naked exhibition in a public place); Elliott and White, 169 Eng. Rep. 1322
(sexual intercourse in public); R. v. Howell and Bentley, (1864) 176 Eng. Rep.
513 (outrage to public decency by encouraging prostitution); and later
Saunders and Hitchcock, 1 Q.B.D. at 15 (crude language luring patrons to an
exhibition); Languish v. Archer, (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 44 (discussing Holmes which
involved naked exposure from a public carriage). Closely related to these were
public advertising of brothels and other types of establishments of ill-repute,
prosecuted under the Disorderly House Act of 1751, 25 Geo. 2. See, e.g., R. v.
Higginson, (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 806 (involving a public exhibition of game cock
fighting indictment for nuisance); R. v. Barrett, (1862) 169 Eng. Rep. 1389
(holding separately let rooms in a house do not constitute a brothel when the
owner plays no role in tenant's immoral transactions); and R. v. Stannard,
(1862) 169 Eng. Rep. 1426 (finding that property owner was not a "keeper" of a
disorderly house under law). Prosecutions also occurred when a keeper of a
public amusement was open on the Lord's Day under the Theatre Act of 1843.
See Wigan v. Strange, (1865) 1 L.R.C.P. 175 (finding dance with music does
not fall under dramatic presentation as would require public licensing).
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movements of the time, not the least of which were concerns over
the destabilizing behavior of the burgeoning working class, the
apparent secularization of English society, concern for standards
of moral behavior, and the increased social and economic mobility
of the middling classes and their aspiration to the moral standing
of the traditional aristocracy in literary and artistic values. One
could argue that these tensions dovetailed with expanding literacy
of the population and the concomitant market accessibility of
publication, especially the penny press." There is little doubt that
the expansion of libel law into areas of more general cultural
mores was a direct reflection of (or reaction to) the democratization
of society and the crumbling traditional standards of cultural
values long assumed to govern public expression and behavior.
B. Statutory Intervention: The Obscene PublicationsAct of 1857
On occasion, Parliament made some effort to rectify the
resulting ambiguities in how civil law should treat public
expression by passing statutes regarding some forms of public
behavior and specifying procedural aspects of consideration in
both public nuisance and libel law that proved a "rougher fit" in
these more contemporary (and generalized) applications.36 Among
35. By the 1880s, blasphemy indictments focused primarily on violations of
cultural mores in reaction to the coarseness of language and tone and
disrespectful satire found in cheap publications such as the Freethinker,
founded in May 1881 and indicted the first time in 1882. See MARSH, supra
note 32, at 138-62 (describing the Freethinker as "[giving] the world the shopcounter, below-stairs version of religion"); see also DAVID VINCENT, LITERACY
AND POPULAR CULTURE IN ENGLAND 1750-1914 204 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1989) (noting that penny dreadfuls were well-suited for those readers with
little education); Gavin Sutter, Penny Dreadfuls and Perverse Domains:
Victorian and Modern Moral Panics, in BEHAVING BADLY: SOCIAL PANIC AND
MORAL OUTRAGE -

VICTORIAN AND MODERN PARALLELS

159-69 (Judith

Rowbotham and Kim Stevenson,eds., Ashgate 2003) (explaining that the press
was thought of as a moral guide and that penny dreadfuls were aimed at
younger members of the population using objectionable topics).
36. Most statutes regarding public nuisances specified procedures for
indicting and subsequently punishing offenders and continued to rely on the
common law for the definition of the offenses themselves, for example, the
Vagrancy Acts of 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 83 and 1838 1 & 2 Vict. c. 38 (banning
indecent exhibitions in public view), the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 2 & 3
Vict. c. 47 (banning the exhibition for sale of obscene materials), various acts
regulating "disorderly houses" (neighborhood misbehaviors surrounding
domiciles used for prostitution, though prostitution itself was not illegal), and
various acts licensing theatres, e.g. 10 Geo. 2, c. 28; 25 Geo. 2. s. 36; 28 Geo. 3,
s. 30; and 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68; each statute expanding the operative definition of
what constituted "entertainment of the stage" by law requiring licensing. The
dilemma of continuing to use common law definitions of offenses was reflected
in the Court's labored effort to apply conventional definitions of theatre
performance to new theatrical forms, as in Wigan, 1 L.R.C.P. 175 (concluding
that "ballet divertissement" was more likened to dance-with-music than to
drama, thus requiring no license and allowing no regulation under current
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these, and the benchmark in the evolution of obscenity law, was
the Obscene Publications Act of 1857.37 By the mid-nineteenth
century, prosecutions for obscene libel followed a traditional
procedural regime. Under common law, an indictment could be
brought by public officials or private persons against anyone
publishing materials that might be considered obscene.38
In
practice, because, the obscene nature of the publication was
considered a question of fact to be determined by the magistrate
and the nature ofjits publication or its tendency (effect) toward the
corruption of public morals was a matter of summary judgment or
jury consideration, procedural questions regarding due cause often
jeopardized swift or successful prosecution. At the same time,
application of common law sanctions - appropriate fines and
possible jail sentences - seemed to have little effect on the
economic growth of the market for salacious materials.
Determined to bring orderliness to prosecutions and more
effectively deter future distribution, the 1857 Act attempted to
focus prosecution on taking cheap and salacious obscene
publications out of circulation while, at the same time, providing
some procedural safeguards against arbitrary charges at common
law against holdings of respectable works of art or literature.
Those initiating the charge were required to present evidence
under oath to the local magistrate that such materials were being
held for purposes of sale, upon which the magistrate would issue a
warrant allowing entry of police (or even the accusing private
persons) into commercial or private premises for seizure of the
materials. After seizure, the court issued a summons to the
proprietor of the location from which the materials were seized,
calling upon him to show cause why the materials should not be
destroyed and, in effect, asking him to plead that the materials
were not obscene, were not intended to corrupt morals, or were of
compensating social value or benefit to society regardless of their
obscene nature.39 Under section 4 of the Act, magistrate decisions
law) or the court's continuous hair-splitting over whether the owner of a
domicile used by prostitutes was the "keeper" of the house as in Stannard, 169
Eng. Rep. 1426 (holding that an owner not living on premises was not a keeper
as understood in common law and therefore not legally an accessory after the
fact to the bawdy nuisance created by prostitutes engaged in their trade).
37. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83. For background on the Parliamentary debates on
this legislation, see Lord Campbell's Act, supra note 16, at 223 (noting the

"bitter struggle" that took place before the legislation passed and how
opponents feared the powers granted under the legislation were too broad); see
also Roberts, supra note 2, at 616 (discussing the dispute over the legislation,
particularly in regard to literature that may actually have artistic merit).
38. See, e.g., S.M. WADDENS, SEXUAL SLANDER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND: DEFAMATION IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, 1815-1855 117
(Univ. Toronto Press 2000) (discussing various cases where private persons
initiated prosecutions for libelous materials).
39. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 16, at 129-31. In none of the cases prior
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upholding the destruction order could be appealed to Quarter
Sessions on matters of fact or law and subsequently to the
Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench on matters of law.4"
The Act provided a set of summary procedures administered
by magistrates and Justices of the Peace as part of routine
policing.4' Although those procedures established due process by
which the owner or purveyor of the seized materials might secure
their release, it was clear that the purpose of the Act was to put in
place an immediate economic sanction designed to effect greater
deterrence, i.e. the legal destruction of the materials should the
purveyor be unsuccessful in gaining their release. The only
avenue for securing their release was to somehow demonstrate
that the materials were not, as Lord Campbell cautioned in
proposing the Act, "written for the single purpose of corrupting the
morals of youth and of a nature calculated to shock the common
feelings of decency in the well regulated mind."42
During the Parliamentary debates, two criticisms were
paramount: first, it was argued that existing structures of
regulation (social policing) under the common law were sufficient
and there was no need for statutory intervention; and second, it
was feared that the legislation created an overly-broad power of
search and seizure, lacking safeguards that would confine its
execution to standards of common reasonableness. At risk was

to passage of the 1857 Act did defendants or defense counsel take issue with
the portrayal of the challenged materials as obscene; instead, they relied on
claims that the defendants were well-intentioned in their publication
(including that the material had social value), or were not responsible for or
were ignorant of the content, when they participated in its distribution. Id.
Therefore, the initial destruction order cases argued under the 1857 Act were,
to a degree, based on uncharted legal grounds regarding an operational
definition of what constituted obscene material, leaving this area of law open
to interpretation by dictum as was provided by Hicklin. Id. Similarly,
prosecutions for importation of indecent or obscene articles under the Customs
Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 102, contained no operative definition for what
would be considered obscene. Id.
40. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83.
41. Id.
42. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 613 (quoting the Hansard Parliamentary
Debates, 146 PARL. DEB., H.L., H.C., (3rd ser.) (1857) 329). Sweeps conducted
under the 1857 Act did, in fact, close down many of the most notorious
distributors in the Holywell Street section of London, but the trade in
pornographic materials rose to a radically expanded market of diverse
offerings by the 1880s. See Lynda Nead, From Alleys to Courts: Obscenity and
the Mapping of Mid-Victorian London, 37 NEW FORMATIONS 33 (1999)
(depicting a rise in demand for obscene materials during the Victorian Era);
see also Tom Lewis, Legislating Morality: Victorian and Modern Legal
Responses to Pornography, in BEHAVING BADLY: SOCIAL PANIC AND MORAL
OUTRAGE - VICTORIAN AND MODERN PARALLELS 143-58 (Judith Rowbotham

and Kim Stevenson,eds., Ashgate 2003) (discussing the Victorian legal
response to the publication of obscene materials with a focus on Hicklin).
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inappropriate application to reputable, perhaps even classic, works
of art and literature, raising the specter of a repressive "official
morality" and its constraining effect on literary culture.'
The Act created no new legislatively defined criminal offense
and provided no legislative guidance for how obscene materials
might be differentiated as a matter of fact rather than of law.
Instead, it provided magistrates with legal authority to order the
destruction of materials they considered obscene as defined by
common law." There was no penalty imposed on the publisher or
consumer, but it did place the burden of defense directly on the
distributor (arguably the economic stakeholder) to demonstrate
why the materials should not be destroyed. The distributor could
meet this burden by showing either that such materials were not
within the definition of obscene, which was judged by the
reasonable doubt standard and applied by the magistrate as a
matter of fact, or that although technically obscene, such materials
were in their tendency of sufficient social importance as to
overcome any potentially corrupting influence.
Prosecutors
however were obligated to demonstrate that the offending
materials were actually made available for sale to the public,
excluding privately commissioned sales and private collections."
Although the Act emboldened prosecutions, it left untouched
their common law basis in libel and provided no legal definitions
regarding the obscene nature of the materials or how one might

43. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 619 (citing the Hansard Parliamentary
Debates, 146 PARL. DEB., H.L., H.C., (3rd ser.) (1857) 327, 1152-53, 1355-57,
and 147 PARL. DEB., H.L., H.C., (3rd ser.) (1857) 1475-84, 1862-66). One of the
principal concerns expressed in the Parliamentary debates was whether local
police officers and/or magistrates would be able to distinguish between
authentic art and literature on the one hand and obscene materials meant to
pander to the undisciplined mind on the other, and the degree to which
arbitrariness at the initiation stage, by local officials or by private citizens,
might lead to legal harassment of those with bona fide collections or holdings.
Id.
44. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83.
45. ROBERTSON, supra note 16, at 28-29. The latter was critical, for it
excluded both the literary gentry and the private bookseller who was
commissioned to find a copy of certain material for a selected clientele from
the sweep "of the streets" (or specifically Holywell Street). Id. In fact, most
sophisticated materials of this kind, imported generally from France, were
largely beyond the means of the public until more widespread literacy and the
rise of mass consumption publications (such as the penny press) made them
more accessible by mid-century. Id. The final language of the 1857 Act, after
amendment specifying that holding obscene materials "for the purpose of sale
or

distribution, exhibition for purposes of gain ....or being otherwise

published for purposes of gain .... ." 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, s. 1 (emphasis added)
was unlawful, was interpreted to exclude private holdings or collections,
regardless of the "publication" (showing to others). See also Roberts, supra
note 2, at 620-22 (describing the history that led up to the passing of the
Obscene Publications Act).
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determine their tendency to corrupt morals. Its objective was to
regulate, not eliminate, publication of pornography, and said
nothing about its production or its private possession.
The
principal concern was with materials of a peculiar "moral
typography" that portended both a moral danger (pornography as
a social harm) and a medical pathology, jeopardizing the "moral or
ethical self-discipline" of the expanding and socially concerned
middle class as well as the debilitating effects on both the
individual's body and soul.46
The Act's subsequent effects on prosecutions at common law
were in its application. The first case in which the common law of
obscene libel arose under the procedural safeguards prescribed by
the Act was Hicklin.
III.

THE JUXTAPOSITION OF COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW

Hicklin evolved from the complaint of a police officer who, at
the direction of a Borough Watch Committee, had seized 252
copies of a pamphlet entitled The Confessional Unmasked and
delivered them
for judgment to the magistrates
in
Wolverhampton." The pamphlet already had been published in a
number of editions for over twenty years (initially in 1836) and
these particular copies initially had been purchased from William
Strange by the Protestant Electoral Union (PEU), which in turn
sold copies to Henry Scott." The copies in question were seized
46. HUNTER, SAUNDERS, & WILLIAMSON, supra note 16 at 64-66; Lynda
Nead, Bodies of Judgment: Art, Obscenity, and the Connoisseur, in LAW AND
THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 203-25
(Costas Dousinas and Lynda Nead, eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1999). This
concern carried over into debates over aesthetic qualities in art and literature
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The debates focused on the kind
of aesthetic distance needed to reach higher moral narratives, as opposed to
more subjective, emotion-based approaches to expression which appeal to
basic instincts. This distinction becomes the basis of legal actions regarding
artistic legitimacy and whether art can be pornographic and/or subject to
criminal prosecution under obscene libel.
See PEASE, supra note 11
(describing the relationship between aesthetics and obscenity from the
eighteenth century to present and highlighting the way in which earlytwentieth century writers incorporated a sexually explicit discourse into their
works); LINDA MERRILL, A POT OF PAINT: AESTHETICS ON TRIAL IN WHISTLER
v. RUSKIN (Smithsonian 1992); see also TIM BARRINGER, READING THE PRERAPHAELITES (Yale 1998); ELIZABETH PRETTEJOHN, ROSSETTI AND HIS CIRCLE
(Tate 1997) (discussing the entire literary debate over the Pre-Raphaelite
"fleshy school" of art); CELIA MARSHIK, BRITISH MODERNISM AND CENSORSHIP
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (examining the degree to which literati began to
engage in self-censorship to avoid the social or economic onus of claims their
works graphically appealed to sexuality or sensuality).
47. 3 L.R.Q.B. at 362.
48. Copies of The Confessional Unmasked, designed "to protest the
teachings of the Romish and Puseyite systems, which are un-English, immoral
and blasphemous; and to maintain the Protestantism of the Bible and the
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from the possession of Scott and ordered destroyed by the
magistrates as an obscene libel under the Obscene Publications
Act of 1857.' 9 The destruction order was appealed by Scott to
Quarter Sessions as provided by Section 4 of the Act.
In Quarter Sessions, all parties conceded the obscene nature
of at least half of the pamphlet, but the Recorder, Benjamin
Hicklin, Esq., concluded that Scott's intention was not to corrupt
morals but rather to promote the PEU and its political message
and ruled in Scott's favor.5" The case then moved to the Divisional
Court of the Queen's Bench (QBD) on a question of law because a
finding that the pamphlet was obscene and its publication was a
misdemeanor offense should have automatically sustained the
destruction order. At common law, a finding of obscenity was a
judicial finding of fact, unmitigated by intent or effect under
criminal libel law. By using the common law understanding of
obscenity in an application of the Act, the Recorder became
entrapped in the juxtaposed common law language that seemed to
call for a second finding - that the distributor had intended to
corrupt public morals. Procedurally, the Court was being asked if
the initial magistrate's decision was reasonable, i.e. that the
material at issue was of such a character as to fall under the law
of obscene libel, and if publication of such material would warrant
prosecution as a misdemeanor. If so, the magistrate could order
seizure and destruction of the materials under the 1857 Act - the
last step of a judicial intervention designed to prevent "vexatious
prosecutions."51
liberty of England" and support candidates for Parliamentary seats committed
to defeating "the deep-laid machinations of the Jesuits" were sold on the street
at cost by the PEU as a public lobbying technique, on the basis of which a
number of subsequent obscene libel charges were filed, as in Steele v.
Brannan. See generally HUNTER, SAUNDERS, & WILLIAMSON, supra note 16,

at 66-73 (discussing the development of obscenity law).
49. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 362.
50. Id. at 360.
51. Id. at 374. During Parliamentary debates, Lord Campbell's Act was
presented as a statement of principles in response to his observation of the
number of unsuccessful prosecutions for obscene libel and paid little heed - in
statutory language - to how those principles might be applied (or misapplied)
by local magistrates in the future, as first manifest in Hicklin. See Roberts,
supra note 2, at 626-28 (examining the Hicklin's application of the Obscene
Publications Act). Hicklin was one of a number of cases in which those
prosecuted for publication of an obscene libel were not the kinds of "panderers
of salacious filth" that Lord Campbell professed to have in mind in proposing
the statute. Id. The defense initially argued, and the Recorder Benjamin
Hicklin accepted, that, in the absence of criminal intent, the publication could
not be considered a misdemeanor offense and the warrant for seizure was
thereby from the outset outside the magistrate's jurisdiction. Id. The legal
dilemma posed by the 1857 Act was that such warrants were issued by
magistrates in response to sworn testimony by those initiating the action that
materials were qualified by subject matter for prosecution as obscene libel,
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The decision at Queen's Bench, written by Chief Justice
Cockburn, focused almost entirely on the question of whether an
honest or public-serving purpose could justify what had already
been determined to be an obscene libel - the publication of obscene
material. The definition of what was deemed obscene was never at
issue. In fact, it was considered to be commonly understood and
conceded that half of the pamphlet itself - based solely on the
topics addressed therein - was obscene. The question of whether
an obscene libel could nevertheless be justified was considered a
matter of intent, with the presumption at law being that
when the act is in itself unlawful. .. the proof of its justification or
excuses lies in the defendant; and in failure, the law implies a
criminal intent. .. everyman, if he be a rational man, must be
considered to intend that which must necessarily follow from what
he does ... [and] if there be an infraction of the law the intention to
break the law must be inferred, and the criminal character of the
publication is not affected or qualified by there being some ulterior
object in view [as] the immediate and primary object of the parties
of a different and of an honest character. 2
Cockburn's instructions to the jury regarding the features of a
publication subject to a charge of criminal obscenity ultimately
became obiter dictum, the operative (and ubiquitously cited)
standard in proceedings related to the common law offense of
obscene libel. The instruction stated: "I think the test is this,
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences,
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
53
fall."
Cockburn's focus on the issue of criminal intent, rather than
an operative definition of obscenity, can fairly be inferred from the
common assumption that moral health could be damaged by
exposure to obscene words and images as defined by social norms
falling into two specifications: (a) the mental/moral attributes of
those most vulnerable upon exposure, and (b) those public spaces
in which those most vulnerable were most likely to be exposed.
Although the former was left undefined and may have lead (as it
does today) to a circular argument, it is fairly clear that Cockburn
was referring particularly to young persons' rather than opening
only after which a jury could consider intent. Id.
52. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 364, 366, 370.
53. Id. at 371.

54. The broad reference to "young persons" or "youth" in the nineteenth
century development of the law of obscene libel defies greater specification,
particularly since literacy rates among youth still varied greatly by social
class. The appearance of salacious materials in shop windows or in the hands
of street hawkers on Holywell Street may well have titillated the imaginations
of "working class youth" who were commonly assumed to be undisciplined and
subject to emotion rather than reason, but that would not explain societal
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a discussion of "particularly susceptible persons," young and old.55
fears regarding religious (as in Hicklin), philosophical (as in Williams and
Richard Carlile), scientific (as in Bradlaugh and Besant) or literary (as in
Moxon) tracts that were commonly prosecuted. The principal concern was
largely for the impressionable minds of the children of the emerging middle
class, more literate and more mobile by the latter half of the nineteenth
century, and perhaps rendered more susceptible by the secularization of
English culture. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 614-15 (examining the affect on
the "youth" who were beginning to experience a longer period of economic and
social dependence); History of the Crime, supra note 16, at 48-50 (discussing
the development of law enforcement for obscene publications). Considerable
concern was expressed in writing and in statutory law for the moral health
and protection of young girls, particularly those legally engaged in prostitution
under the age-of-consent law (at age 12, subsequently raised to age 13 in 1875
under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 94) or pressed into white slavery on the continent,
resulting in the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69,
raising the age of consent to 16 and protecting females of various ages under
18 from sexual abuses. See, e.g., Deborah Gorman, The "Maiden Tribute of
Modern Babylon" Re-examined: Child Prostitution and the Idea of Childhood
in Late-Victorian England, 21 VICT. STUD. 353 (1978) (describing the
widespread persistence of juvenile prostitution in late-Victorian England).
Concern was also extended to the moral upbringing of young girls of the
middle class, still largely educated in the home, regarding the moral
narratives of the art and literature to which they might be exposed. See, e.g.,
CATHERINE ROBSON, MEN IN WONDERLAND: THE LOST GIRLHOOD OF THE

VICTORIAN GENTLEMAN 154-93 (Princeton 2001) (detailing nineteenth century
fascination with young girls); Celia Marshik, The Case of "Jenny" Dante
GabrielRossetti and the CensorshipDialectic, 33 VICT. LIT. & CULT. 557 (2005)
(describing censorship in the late Victorian Era); and THOMAS, supra note 16,
at 85-91 (explaining the history of censorship in England).
55. History of a Crime, supra note 16, at 47-51. If the question becomes one
of the moral/aesthetic abilities and predispositions of certain audiences, one
might be inclined to argue that those of weak will or little education (and
therefore social discipline) would be most susceptible to responding to such
materials in a lascivious manner damaging to the public welfare in some
sense. It may be difficult to determine all those who fall into that "most
susceptible" category, except by identifying all those who purchased such
materials in public places. By assuming that there are individuals of weak
character and/or social discipline, the predominant societal response is to
control any negative societal effects by regulating access to materials that may
pander to those weaknesses. But then one faces the dilemma posed either by
closing off the public space to all those who might fall into that category or by
censoring all such materials, the former requiring a predetermination of
character traits and the latter precluding access to those of sufficient
character and social discipline to confine their subsequent behavior within the
bounds prescribed by social norms. If one's purpose were to prevent the
lascivious behavior that might be an undesired result of the consumption (or
even the mere exposure to) such materials, one would either have to keep
certain purchasers under surveillance after purchase and await the imminent
prospect of such behavior, or simply intuit that lascivious behavior would be
the expected result and intervene at the point of purchase, again assuming the
intent to engage in such behavior from the act of purchase. The problem lies
in the diverse composition of those who move even intermittently in the public
space. Openly accessible to a populous undifferentiated as to character traits,
education, upbringing, and/or susceptibilities, the public marketplace contains
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It was more common that a determination of intent would focus in
the latter area, complicated by the broad range of persons that
might be found in the public space and to whom exposure might be
damaging, and the kind of exposure one might confront in those
public spaces.
To this extent, certain commercial or other districts with a
concentration of purveyors of such materials came under increased
scrutiny from social agencies or local police and were subject to
individual complaints, periodic sweeps, and closings. The question
of intent, therefore, became subsumed in a set of interlocking
presumptions about the nature of the content, the impact of such
materials, and the qualities of those who might purchase them.
Making such materials publicly available for sale demonstrated
intent on the part of a distributor/bookseller to pander to those
susceptible to lascivious interest. Those who might demonstrate
an interest in or actually purchase such materials thereby
demonstrated weak character and social discipline and intent to
engage in lascivious behavior. In other words, by their presence in
such an open marketplace of obscene materials, vendors
demonstrated their intent to pander, and consumers demonstrated
their intent to engage in lascivious behavior. 6
Given that the market for such materials had previously been
small, discrete, and confined in large measure to the literate and
affluent patrons who privately commissioned booksellers to secure
copies of selected (largely foreign) publications, the expanded
judicial focus on the marketplace itself reflected and spurred the
broadening potential market for such materials. This new market
included the more literate and affluent middle class and

at any one time those actively seeking out purchase, those who might be
enticed to purchase (by window displays, or street hawkers), those who are
indifferent to the availability of such materials, and those who may be
affronted by their availability in public.
56. In the mid-nineteenth century, the focus was entirely on the content of

the materials and the intent of those immediately involved in their
distribution or sale. Not at issue was whether a particular author or artist
intended to attract the lascivious interest of those who might read or see the
work. This rendered any literary or artistic works susceptible to varying
interpretations as to their actual or potential impact, opening up a centurylong philosophical (but rarely legal) debate over the cultural governance of
taste in any given community and how a society can protect its important
literature and art. PEASE, supra note 11. Arguably, The Confessional

Unmasked was intended by its author to expose heinous practices of the
Catholic Church, practices that undermined the social order. However, at no
point was testimony entered or sought regarding what the author intended;
instead, judgments focused on the degree to which it visited scandal upon an

established institution in British society (an anticipated impact which would
have automatically warranted prosecution as an obscene libel under common
law) and the manner in which it was at that time distributed (pandered as a
lascivious description of intimate sexual details revealed in the confessional).
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ultimately the lower classes which, though demonstrably less
literate and less affluent, could nonetheless be reached with
cheaper cost and less demanding publications such as ribald
stories, explicitly sexual illustrations or postcards, and, of course,
the scandalous penny press."
IV. OBSCENE LIBEL AS A LEGAL REGIME

The Act of 1857 retained the common assumptions about
content in cases of obscene libel and simply provided a procedure
for issuing warrants and hearing appeals, the latter of which
involved impaneling juries to apply the commonly held standards
of public morality of the community to policing actions and
magistrate decisions. 8 The Hicklin decision was one of several
that established the parameters of the application of the Act,59 and
Cockburn's clarification was designed to aid the jury in knowing
exactly what it was to decide. As in most cases of obscene libel,
the Court and the jury deferred to the judgment made initially by
the magistrates in issuing the warrant, i.e., that the materials
seized were of an obscene nature and appropriately subject to
indictment under common law. The role of the jury was to
determine the direct role of the plaintiff in the publication of the

57. See
IAIN
MCCALMAN,
RADICAL
UNDERWORLD:
PROPHETS,
REVOLUTIONARIES, AND PORNOGRAPHERS IN LONDON: 1795-1840 (Clarendon
1993) (describing the marketing of pornography to the lower class); COLETTE
COLLIGAN, TRAFFIC IN OBSCENITY FROM BYRON TO BEARDSLEY: SEXUALITY
AND EXOTICISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PRINT CULTURE (Joseph Bristow,
ed., Palgrave 2006) (discussing the development of sexually explicit
publications in nineteenth century England). A primary motive for Lord
Campbell's proposal of the 1857 Act was apparently to simply stem the rising
tide of public indecency, evidenced by recurring violations by a number of
notorious publishers of radical (libertine) pornography, such as William
Dugdale whose conviction was upheld in Dugdale v. R.,(1853) 169 Eng. Rep.
638. See SIGEL, supra note 11, at 45-48 (including a discussion of William
Dugdale's publication of, and resulting conviction for, the PRODUCTION OF
REVOLUTION); see also Roberts, supra note 2, at 616-18 (noting that Lord
Campbell claimed that the material he complained of had absolutely no
artistic value); Lord Campbell's Act, supra note 16, at 226 (examining the
reasons why the trade in obscene materials was relatively unaffected by
common law prosecutions prior to the passage of the Obscene Publications
Act).
58. Cf Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (indicating how the contemporary community
standards aspect added to American obscenity law).
59. See Steele v. Brannan, 7 L.P.C.P. 261, and Bradlaugh and Besant, 2
Q.B.D. at 569 (quoting Hicklin, the Parliamentary debates over the passage of
the 1857 Act, and Lord Campbell's justification for it). After Steele, Hicklin
becomes identified as the doctrinal definition for the offense of obscene libel
and subsequently quoted verbatim in Odgers' governing treatise on libel in
1881. ODGERS, supra note 31, at 404-07.
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materials and to consider whether there was convincing evidence
to counter the presumption of pandering intent.6 °
The Hicklin decision cannot, however, be considered in
isolation. As a case at common law, it must be assumed to reflect
consistent application of general principles of legal thought over a
range of legal issues and court decisions. Too often, based on more
contemporary concerns in obscenity law, discussion of Hicklin
tends to focus on the plaintiffs intent in publishing the materials
in two regards: first, whether the Court should be governed by the
obscene nature of isolated passages or parts of the materials at
issue (as opposed to the broader context of the materials as an
integrated whole), and second, whether the intent of the plaintiff
in publishing the materials serves some broader societal purpose
that should to some degree mitigate the court's subsequent finding
or sentencing. Each calls upon the Court to consider the broader
societal value of the publication as a mitigating factor regarding
materials that contain presumptively obscene aspects. However,
neither considers whether the materials themselves meet a
commonly understood standard as "obscene" or the legal or
common law basis for why "obscene materials" constitute an
indictable criminal offense.
Cockburn's decision, often reduced simplistically to what
became known as the Hicklin test for obscenity, contains a range
of elements at common law that can only be understood in that
While the indictable crime in Hicklin was Scott's
context.
publication (possession for purpose of distribution) of an obscene
pamphlet, the entire case revolved around evidence regarding
whether he published it within the meaning of the common law
and which parts of it were being identified as obscene. To the
degree that the obscenity of parts of the pamphlet was admitted,
or at least was not challenged by the defendant, and that his
possession with intent to distribute was also admitted, there was,
in effect, no contested aspect of the case until the appeal was
heard at Quarter Sessions when the Recorder, Hicklin, assumed a
second level of intent was requisite to conviction: the intent to
corrupt morals. This standard did not arise from the statutory
language of the Act (which was procedural in nature and did not
mention intent) but rather from Hicklin's interpretation of what

60. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 374. The presumption of the Court in every
instance was that the distributor of the materials intended to pander to those

of weak constitution, which the defense could counter either by evidence that
the materials at question were not obscene as defined under common law or
that the materials, though arguably obscene in part, contained literary or

artistic insights (or even political information) from which the public might
benefit, or by testimony of the defendant or those of public repute as to his
moral character and/or public standing in the community, testimony designed
to counter the presumption of ill-intent.
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was required of a misdemeanor offense contra bonos mores at
common law, i.e., in the publication of an obscene libel.61 In this,
Hicklin would have rightly considered that case law was
directive, 6 as was Lord Campbell's well-publicized rationale for
proposing the legislation in the first place.
The question of whether the defendant intended a particular
behavioral consequence by his publication of the pamphlet brought
to the fore a full range of interlocking issues at common law that
were subsumed to the simple finding of fact regarding whether or
not the defendant published the materials considered obscene.' A
number of these issues must be examined in both principle and
application in order to see the full import of the question before
the Court in Hicklin.
A. Obscene Libel as a Criminal Offense
Prior to Curll, the criminal offense of libel required words
that were damaging to the reputation of a specific party and
communicated in some permanent form of presentation, i.e., in
writing.'
Curll, however, expanded the reach of the criminal
offense by specifying that a libel (or publication) had a public
consequence independent of any specific reference to persons - a
consequence provoking potentially offended parties to retaliatory

61. Obscene Publications Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, § 1. The Act
stipulates only that magistrates may issue a warrant for search and seizure of
materials "of such a character and description [i.e. obscene] that the
publication of them would be a misdemeanor [at common law]."
62. Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation,Precedent and the Common Law,
7 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 215, 226-33 (1987). This is not to say that courts at
common law were strictly bound by precedent as a straight-forward set of
exclusionary (positive) rules but rather as a set of guiding principles that
sprang from decisions in analogous prior case circumstances. Lacking
statutory guidance, courts were relatively free to apply what they interpreted
as patterns of judicial reasoning found in prior cases, recognizing that cases all
had unique circumstances that made application of prior reasoning an untidy
business. Id. Also, prior to the nineteenth century, consistent and complete
records of case decisions, particularly those of nominate reports, were not
available, and by that time courts had already begun to rely on legal treatises
for such guidance.

See, e.g., MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND

ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850 (Clarendon 1991) (discussing the
multitude of common law courts that relied on treatises). In the field of libel
law, the two preeminent treatises to which courts referred were STARKIE and
ODGERS, supra note 31.
63. These interlocking issues are discussed in some detail in ST. JOHNSTEVAS, supra note 16, and J.E. Hall Williams, Obscenity in Modern English
Law, 20 LAW & CONT. PROB. 630 (1955).
64. In general, a libel is a statement that causes harm, as a tort subject to
civil action seeking personal damages to the reputation of specific parties or as
a crime, indicating its effect - "conducing to a breach of the peace" - must be
suppressed for the public good. See ODGERS, supra note 31, at 373 (describing
the reasons libel is considered a criminal offense).
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behavior that would, in turn, necessarily breach the peace.' In
effect, the injurious nature of the words published would be
related to their general offensiveness rather than a specific
challenge to an individual's reputation and would naturally lead
(tend) toward breaches of the peace that were impossible to
restrain because those persons inclined to engage in retaliatory
behavior would do so based on an assumption that such injuries
would not and could not be redressed through normal mechanisms
of public justice.' The key element in libel law was not the actual
content of a publication, but rather its tendency to cause an
indelible injury felt by a range of offended parties, an injury that
would precipitate in its natural (inevitable) course a retaliatory

65. Curll, 17 St. Trials at 154 (citing De Libellous Famosis, (1606) 77 Eng.
Rep. 250. The Star Chamber was established in 1488 to prosecute libels
against the Church (blasphemous libel) and State (seditious libel) that
jeopardized civil peace. After the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641, both
civil (tort) and criminal offenses of libel moved under the jurisdiction of the
King's Bench, only the former requiring evidence of damage. In De Libellous
Famosis, Coke established the distinction between personal (private) libels
involving damage to individual proprietary interests and more serious political
(public) libels that threatened a breach of the peace. 77 Eng. Rep. at 251.
Among public libels were included sedition, blasphemy, obscenity (added by
Curll in 1727), and utterings that would generally lead to a breach of the
peace. By Lord Campbell's Libel Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, section 6, a
defense against a charge of public forms of libel could include truth but only if
accompanied by an inclination to produce public benefit. See Van Vechten
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation. 1, 3 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 546, 559-67 (1903) (describing the defense of truth in Lord Campbell's
Libel Act). See generally Ralph V. Turner, The Origins of Common Pleas and
King's Bench, 21 AMER. J. LEG. HIST. 238 (1977) (reviewing the history of libel
law and the use of truth as a defense).
66. It would be in the nature of such a publication to offend naturally (or
inevitably) - in tone and manner, more than in content - an indeterminate
number of persons in society. The sheer unpredictability of how many there
would be or how and when they may act in a retaliatory fashion made the
offense a crime worth suppressing in the interests of public order. The
difficulty, of course, was determining which publications might tend to cause
such a reaction. That responsibility fell to juries applying the standard of
"reasonableness," that is anticipating how might the average Englishman
react to such a publication. However, the assumption in most cases was that
the challenged expression or publication was actionable per se and required no
evidence regarding actual injury because of the doctrinal imputation of (sinful)
malice held over from the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.
As
jurisdiction over libel moved to temporal courts, the imputation of malice
adopted a legal rather than religious continence. See Van Vechten Veeder,
The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation. 11, 4 COLUMBIA L. REV. 33,
35-36 (1904) (describing the imputation of malice in libel cases). It is critical
to note that juries were directed to consider and anticipate tendency, not
decipher whether the publication exhibited certain content (i.e. subject matter)
or mode of expression (e.g. lewdness).

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:393

behavior that would breach the peace and be undeterred by the
ordinary enforcement of public laws regarding such behavior."
In Curil, the crime of libel reached beyond its traditional
(technical) application of words causing personal damage to the
reputation of specific parties to a broader platform: written words
without personal reference that would naturally cause offense and
tend to precipitate disruptions in public order, specifically words
regarding religion, civic virtue, or morality. As a criminal offense,
libel was now interpreted as creating public harm through the act
of publication itself because written or published words (unlike
spoken words) had an unlimited range of potential impact over
time, and because of that broader range of potential harm, those
who published such words had a greater responsibility for
anticipating and avoiding the possible harms they may cause.68
After Curli, it was a small step to anticipate the subject areas in
which such public harm might be most easily precipitated by
publication of what might be interpreted simply as controversial
words to which the common law of libel could be applied: religion

67. The doctrinal emphasis on the effect (rather than the content) of a libel
was spawned by Coke's De Libellous Famosis, his own case reporting on the
seditious libel prosecution of Lewis Pickering for posting polemic verses
against the practices of the Church of England and its ecclesiastical courts on
the occasion of the death of the Archbishop of Canterbury, a case in which he,
as the King's Attorney General, served as chief prosecutor. 77 Eng. Rep. at
251. The principal argument, derived from Roman rather than English
common law and upheld in subsequent judgments for the next two hundred
years, was that criticism in a public and offensive manner (contra bonos
mores) leads to breach of the peace and in no circumstance was justifiable.
Veeder, supra note 65, at 564-65. More specifically, criticism of a public man is
a challenge to the judgment of the Crown who is served by that man, a
challenge that weakens the hierarchical and monarchial bonds that keep
society stable. Id. The effect of a libel therefore is to threaten social order in
permanent fashion, clearly a criminal offense and one that does not require
that consequence (actus reus) to actually occur before the sovereign can and
should intervene. See id. (analyzing the necessity of libel law for maintaining
public peace); Alistair Bellany, A Poem on the Archbishop's Hearse:
Puritanism,Libel, and Sedition after the Hampton Court Conference, 35 J. BR.
STUD. 137 (1995) (discussing the influence of religion on libel law).
68. Curll argued that libel need not always be interpreted in the technical
sense, i.e. causing personal harm, but rather qualified as a temporal crime if
the words were in writing, reflected on religion, virtue or morality, and tended
in some manner to disturb civil order, and thereby expanded the traditional
reach of libel law by contending broadly that "it is libellous from its being a
book, and not from the matter of its contents." CurlU, 93 Eng. Rep. 849. The
temporal nature of criminal libel therefore was derived from its tendency of
consequence (its publication per se) rather than from its defaming or injurious
content. In effect, Curll announced that the act of publication provided the
civil component required to bring questions of moral behavior under the
jurisdiction of the temporal courts, activating common law regime
assumptions regarding tendency and intent.
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(blasphemous libel), civic virtue (seditious libel), and morality
(obscene libel).
B. Natural Tendency and Intent
The criminal nature of obscene libel thereby shifted to its
tendency to produce a consequent behavior that breached the
peace. At common law, the determination of a publication's
"natural tendency" to harm the public order was based on a jury's
consideration of its "reasonable consequence," a determination
that could be and had to be made independent of a defendant's
expressed or implied purpose (motive) in the publication.69 Also
affected was the traditional notion of mens rea, which requires a
person accused of a behavior that caused harm to have intended
that harm. 0 In the evolving law of obscene libel, indictment for
misdemeanor criminal behavior followed from an act of publication
that a jury anticipated had a natural consequence of causing harm
regardless of whether the accused intended that harm or whether
any evidence of actual harm existed or was even claimed.
Cockburn said as much in Hicklin when he argued "[i]f the work
be of an obscene character, it may be questioned whether intention
has anything to do with the matter. But, if intention is necessary,
it must be inferred that the appellant intended the natural
consequences of his act."71
Cockburn's charge to the jury in Hicklin involved all of these
elements. He called upon the members of the jury to determine by
some reasonable standard whether the material published by
Scott would "tend to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a

69. As a carryover from ecclesiastical court jurisdiction over sinful acts,
defamation cases assumed malice, as "it is in the last analysis malice which
gives the publication a natural tendency to harm... Every man must be
presumed to intend and to know the natural and ordinary consequences of his
acts .

. . ."

and that liability under libel is based on "the tendency of the

publication, not ... the intention of the publisher." ODGERS, supra note 31, at
5-6; see also JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF

MANSFIELD (North Carolina 2004) (discussing Lord Mansfield's holdings in
libel cases).
70. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 364. To this point, Cockburn cited Lord Kenyon
from Fowler v. Padget, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1103, 1106, stating, "[ilt is the
principle of natural justice and of our law, that actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea," meaning the act will not make a person guilty unless the mind is also
guilty. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 364. "The intent and the act must both concur
to constitute the crime." Id. Cockburn then quoted his own decision on R. v.
Sleep, (1861) 169 Eng. Rep. 1296, 1301, "[iut is a principle of our law that to
constitute an offense there must be a guilty mind, and that principle must be
imported into the statute, although the Act itself doe not in term make a
guilty mind necessary to the commission of the offense." Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at
364.
71. Id. at 368 (citing R. v. Woodfall, (1770) 98 Eng. Rep. 398).
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publication of this sort may fall."72 In so doing, the Chief Justice
opened the consideration beyond the factual issues of whether
Scott had published (or held with intent to distribute) the
pamphlet and whether the material in the pamphlet was "obscene"
and into the broader arena of whether the publication of that
material may at some time and place have a natural (and harmful)
consequence of depraving or corrupting the morals of some persons
in society. While he was thereby asking the jury to anticipate a
possible harmful consequence, he was not asking them to discern
whether Scott directly intended that consequence in his act of
publication.73 That issue, he instructed, 4 was already determined
as a finding of fact.
The key issue was whether juries were confined to a
determination of tendency, thereby leaving questions of law and
intent to the court, or could alternatively consider varying
interpretations of intent and motive. It was an issue that had
been brewing in the courts through much of the eighteenth
century, particularly in cases of seditious libel where the value of
political discourse and debate was still venerated. The operative
practice was that juries were to calculate the effect (tendency) of
publishing the libel, and the court, as a matter of law, would
resolve issues regarding intent by intuiting mens rea from the act
of publication itself." But more and more, defense counsels shifted
72. Id.
73. As criminal liability rests in part on mens rea, it is necessary to
differentiate intention from desire (or motive) in that an actor may intend the
action (willfully engaging in the action itself) without specification of what
outcome he may anticipate or desire from the action. In traditional common
law, intent was technically subsumed in the act itself - if an actor engaged in
the action, it was assumed he intended to engage in that action and mens rea
was satisfied. See Woodfall, 98 Eng. Rep. at 401 (finding criminal intent
follows from the commission of the act itself). Criminal law then holds him
accountable for the effects of his action, whether or not he desired it or even
recognized it. Id. Liability for the effects of one's action comes with the
engagement in the action itself, and is unmitigated by a preceding desire
(motive) for a possible outcome or, in some cases, evidence of actual harm
(actus reus). Furthermore, liability for one's action requires recognition of all
the possible (reasonable) consequences, that to prevent harm to others, one is
obligated to consider all possible harms that may result from one's action.
Recognizing but not deferring to harmful consequences might be considered
recklessness or criminal negligence if a 'reasonable man' would have foreseen
those consequences. In this sense, having a pure 'primary motive' (a desire for
a particular public good outcome) would not mitigate one's liability for possible
harms that may (incidentally also) result from that same action, whether or
not the primary outcome desired actually comes about. See R.A. Duff,
Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 76 (1989)
(discussing state of mind in criminal law).
74. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75. The principle that intent concur with the act was still doctrinally
accepted more than a century after Woodfall, and was confirmed in Odgers'
treatise which found that, despite a defendant's earnest motives in the
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their arguments from questions of fact to questions of motive and
stipulated that the defendant engaged in publication with intent
to affect a public good."6
Following decades of contentious debate between traditionbound justices and impaneled juries pressed by defense counsels to
consider their clients' higher motives, the issue had arguably been
decided in favor of wider jury discretion in Fox's Libel Law of
1792."7 Fox's Libel Law empowered juries to give their verdict
upon the "whole matter in issue" and "give a general verdict of
guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put at issue.. . and
shall not be required or directed ... to find a defendant or
defendants guilty merely of proof of publication."78
Against this backdrop, Cockburn's instruction to the jury,
including the admonition that intent follows from the criminal
nature of the act of publication itself, an axiom of the common law
perhaps mitigated by Fox's Libel Law, seems an anomaly. The
question was at what stage of the legal discourse could a jury
consider evidence of the defendant's motive, and what form could

dissemination of his views, the judge must still consider the effect of the
dissemination of those views on the subversion of religion, the destruction of
morality, and their capacity "to dissolve all the bonds and obligations of civil
society." ODGERS, supra note 31, at 395-96. However, the inclination of juries
to consider the defendant's motive was already established by the mideighteenth century. OLDHAM, supra note 69, at 218-30. For example, in R. v.
Owen, (1752) 18 St. Trials 1203, the jury found that the defendant did publish
the material but without seditious intent. Hicklin's consideration of a
publisher's intent would have been consistent with that trend in doctrinal
application, even though traditional doctrine would require that the jury focus
attention only on a determination of whether the defendant had in fact
published the material within the meaning of the common law.
76. In Woodfall, a trial for publishing a seditious libel, the defense argued
the publisher's only intention was to inform his fellow subjects and the jury,
attempting to navigate its options under the common law, returned a verdict
of "guilty of the printing and publishing only," indicating its refusal to
presume concomitant guilt of intent. 98 Eng. Rep. at 398. The same scenario
was played out again in the seditious libel trial of R. v. Shipley, (1784) 21 St.
Trials 847, during which Chief Justice Mansfield, following Coke, argued the
role of the jury should be confined to effect (tendency) rather than
consideration of the defendant's motive which would embroil it in "all the
prejudices of the popular cry of the day." OLDHAM, supra note 69, at 229. By
extrapolation, a jury's inclination to accept a contemporary (well-meaning)
motive behind the defendant's action would not have mitigated the defendant's
liability for any harm that may have also resulted. See id. (discussing
Mansfield's attempts to restrain independent-minded juries from exploring
and subsequently basing verdicts on the defendant's intent).
77. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60, subtitled "An Act to Remove Doubts Respecting the
Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel." This Act was proposed and passed with
the intention of overcoming the restrictive rulings of Chief Justice Mansfield
regarding jury roles in libel cases such as Shipley. See OLDHAM, supra note
69, at 230-35 (describing the enactment of Fox's Libel Law).
78. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60, § 1.
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the evidence of motive take. In Hicklin, the argument was
advanced that Scott's motive was to promote the political
viewpoint of the PEU, and there was no evidence, overt or implied,
that his motives included the undermining of religious values or
the general corruption of morals. Although one might expect any
defendant to argue high purpose and disclaim any salacious or
emotional appeal, the issue often tended to revert to jury
consideration of the actual publication itself and the degree to
which it displayed high purpose in its mode of portrayal (by
adaptation to literary or artistic conventions of the day) or its
pattern of distribution (whether its clientele was discretely
chosen). From that, the jury was to form conclusions about the
possibly harmful consequences of publication.
Along similar lines, publications of scientific content with
sufficient but not gratuitous detail, especially those containing
sexual information or which may have inclined less sophisticated
readers away from norms of moral behavior, navigated a fine line
between being obviously written for and distributed to a narrow
and learned scientific audience and being distributed to a wider
and undifferentiated audience with greater informational detail
than necessary.79
This was a major point of contention in
Bradlaugh and Besant, ° in which their publication of information
relating to methods of birth control was indicted as an obscene
libel because it contained more sexual detail than the general
public needed to or were prepared to know, and it was made
readily available to the general public through its cheap price and
indiscriminate distribution.81 The defendants countered - in their
published front piece and in their deliberative and extensive
arguments before the court - that their motives in publication were
clearly not in the direction of the corruption of morals but rather
were designed to sustain and strengthen the institution of
marriage.82 The jury, as in Hicklin, attempted to return a split
verdict - finding the defendants guilty of publication and not
guilty of intent to corrupt morals - but was thwarted by the

79. See GOWAN DAWSON,
DARWIN, LITERATURE
AND
VICTORIAN
RESPECTABILITY 116-61 (Cambridge 2007) (discussing the relationship

between scientific works and obscenity, and the challenges that free thought
publications faced when discussing human physiology and reproduction).
80. (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 607.
81. Cockburn explicitly argued this point to Bradlaugh, maintaining that

there was a level of detail that medical specialists needed to know but the
general public did not, and if it were provided to the general public, it "may be
used to corrupt the public mind." MANVELL, supra note 33, at 132. Cockburn
questioned "whether the same information given to the general public may be
of advantage to them, or whether on the other hand it is not calculated to
influence them in the opposite direction. That is the argument I think you
have to grapple with." Id.
82. Bradlaugh and Besant, 2 Q.B.D. at 609.
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Court's insistence that guilt of publication was necessary and
sufficient to presume guilt of intent.'
C. Precedentand Considerationof the Public Good
It seemed incongruous that a jury, having materials
presented to them by the Court as obscene and thereby a
misdemeanor by definition, would then have the latitude to
examine the materials for compensating social value. By standard
classification, obscene materials were contra bonos mores and
their publication was thereby a criminal act warranting
indictment as a misdemeanor. And yet, by judicial trends codified
in Fox's Libel Law, the jury was licensed to examine all contextual
factors surrounding the publication in question. While decisions
in obscene libel cases were clearly guided by precedent rulings, at
the same time, juries were encouraged to and did consider factors
outside of what might be assumed to be the binding reasoning of
prior decisions in libel cases.'
The inclination toward split
83. It was clear from the transcript in Bradlaugh and Besant that
Cockburn was actually in sympathy with the motives of the defendants and on
several occasions attempted to lead Bradlaugh out of his lengthy and
impassioned argument about the purity of his own motives and into directly
addressing the governing issue of whether the tendency (anticipated effect) of
the publication might lead to immoral consequences, the point on which
Cockburn knew the case would turn. MANVELL, supra note 33, at 123-24.
However, Bradlaugh's arguably undisciplined and martyristic zeal prevented
him from following Cockburn's lead, and their defense was summarily lost,
albeit overturned on a technicality on appeal in 3 Q.B.D. 607 (1878). This
same dynamic had been played out in Moxon, in which the motivation for
publication was clearly literary (he had already published the works of
Wordsworth) and in context of the entirety of the published work of Shelley,
"Queen Mab," actually provided a meaningful benchmark to the ultimate
strength of Shelley's religious faith. 4 St. Trials at 722. Recognizing this, the
jury found Moxon guilty of publishing and rendered no decision regarding
guilty intention, and while the sympathetic Court had no choice but to render
a guilty verdict, Moxon himself was never called for sentencing. Id.
84. Under the common law of stare decisis, a case at hand would be
considered in its particulars as a reflection of basic, self-standing principles by
which decisions in that area of law were rendered, with judges bound to
reasoning from the principles to the degree that the circumstances in the
incident case paralleled prior cases in which the principles had been applied.
This produced "regimes of legal thought" that directed court decisions as a
"collective normative force" that could be considered settled law only to the
degree the principles followed allowed what could be called exclusionary
reasoning (firm rules) and/or were buttressed by exclusionary statutory
language. In the area of criminal obscene libel, discretionary and moral
dimensions were frequently admitted in judicial decision making, indicating
that as an area of law, obscene libel was still unsettled and the Court had (and
exercised) greater latitude to consider multiple sources of legal authority.
Precedent cases, therefore, each reflecting a uniquely weighted collage of both
common and deviating circumstances, only provided the Court with a variable
range of 'exclusionary scope' within which future cases could be considered.
See Perry, supra note 62, at 230-36 (discussing the notion that from the
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verdicts reflected both the open nature of precedent in the area of
obscene libel and that the dictum that emerged from Hicklin had
actually expanded the range of consideration by adding a proviso
regarding the corruption of morals.
Until the 1857 Act,
indictments for obscene libel had been governed by two aspects of
legal regime: first, the materials were obscene, i.e., an outrage to
public decency and contra bonos mores; and second, they were
published. Their obscene nature was a finding of law by the
magistrate in the indictment and not subject to jury inquiry.
Their publication, on the other hand, was a question of fact
presented to the jury, and from which, under common law, the jury
was to presume both tendency - without requiring evidence of
actual harm (standard procedures of criminal libel law) - and
intent, which under common law was inferred from the fact of
publication under mens rea.
Therefore, cases of obscene libel, at least until Hicklin, were
procedurally formulaic by the legal regime of criminal libel. This
did not, however, preclude impassioned defense counterarguments
regarding the defendant's actual intent, which was usually a
mechanism for pleading against a harsher sentence. Nonetheless,
the decision in each case was ultimately dictated by legal regime
rather than by open reasoning or moral arguments.85 Cockburn's
positivist view, the courts are obliged to apply pre-existing source-based laws,
and further examine the levels of exclusion in a contemporary context).
85. Talfourd's defense in Moxon became the prototype of arguments
regarding the Court's obligation to consider the "work as a whole" when
considering either tendency or intent in cases involving artistic or literary
creativity/license. See Ulysses , 5 F. Supp. 182. Critical to consider, Talfourd
argued, was both the development and the product of Shelley's (divine) poetic
genius which Moxon as publisher had preserved and presented to English
society to its own great benefit - as he had in publishing the works of
Wordsworth. Moxon, 4 St. Trials at 699-715. It was critical, he argued, that
the works of Shelley reveal not only the depth of his ultimate Christian faith
but also how he arrived at that faith through introspection and periods of
doubt, a process that was not only revealing about the human condition but
also demonstrated the triumph of examined faith. Id. To claim (as the
prosecution did) that Shelley's youthful self-doubts (those stanzas in "Queen
Mab" indicating the depths of his despair) stood on their own as guiding
statements of non-faith ignored his careful and nurtured exhilaration of final
faith, as reflected in his poetry and his letters later in life. Id. Reading
"Queen Mab" in the context of Shelley's entire body of work over his lifetime,
Talfourd argued, reinforced rather than challenged the fruitfulness of
Christian self-examination. Presaging more modern arguments, Talfourd
further maintained that Shelley himself had a right to have his works read as
a whole (as they were being published by Moxon) as his legacy, his posterity,
and that English society had the right to experience his divine genius
unexpurgated by local prosecutors. Id. The Court in Moxon was forced to
straddle the traditional and the more contemporary notions of intent, charging
the jury with examining the tendency of specific passages and asking whether
those passages were in any immediate context 'neutralized' by faith-affirming
passages. Id. at 720-22. Absent that, Justice Denham asserted, the offensive
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jury charge in Hicklin changed the traditional jury consideration
of intent by stipulating that publication of obscene materials
demonstrated a calculated intent to deprave and corrupt public
morals, more specifically, the morals of those most susceptible to
immoral enticement and those into whose hands such materials
might fall. No longer was the defendant responsible for some
indeterminate range of possible harmful consequences of his
publication (for which no evidence of actual harm or actual
intention was required under criminal libel law) but now the
defendant could be accused of a specific type of intent (moral
corruption of those most susceptible), causing juries to inquire
after evidence of the specific harm claimed or to consider direct
testimony and other evidence regarding his actual (and perhaps
even well-meaning) intent.&
The jury's consideration was thereby expanded to evidence of
tendency and intent, both of which concerned the more specific
societal harm of corrupting the morals of those most susceptible.
More importantly, the legal regimes governing cases of criminal
obscene libel did not preclude this latitude because obscene libel
was an area of unsettled law that was not exclusionary in its
reasoning and had been subject to both moral and legal reasoning
in precedent cases. Although substantiation in statutory language
often contributed to the establishment of binding legal reasoning
in common law, such was not the case in the area of obscene libel.
The Obscene Publications Act of 1857, rather than settling issues
at law by providing firm definitions and standards, instead simply
maintained the existing structure of unsettled law regarding what
was and was not obscene. Broader evidentiary consideration of
tendency and intent converged when juries weighed the possible
range of harmful consequences against defense claims that
positive, public-serving consequences may not only occur from the
same publication, but also may well have been the direct intention
of the publisher. 7
stanzas in "Queen Mab" were in fact libels and the jury "must adhere to
existing law" and find Moxon guilty of a common law misdemeanor. Id.
86. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 16, at 141. After Hicklin, the first
manifestation of this expanded consideration came in Bradlaugh and Besant,

during which the defendants not only strongly dissented from the portrayal of
their publication as corrupting morals, but rather asserted that their
publication was demonstrably supportive of dominant English cultural mores,
especially those regarding the sanctity of marriage. Cockburn acknowledged
these as evidence regarding intent but continued to direct Bradlaugh's
attention to the imputation of immoral tendency that some individuals,
married or not, may have if in possession of birth control information.
87. The implicit admission by judges (including Blackburn's commentary in
Hicklin) and juries that published materials can have a range of beneficial as

well as dilatory effects on potential audiences in society presaged the 'public
good defense' that became legally recognized in the 1879 Criminal Code
Commission Report. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 16, at 150-51.
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Juries were asked to mediate potential harms and potential
goods after having been advised that the materials in question
were by law obscene and indictable, and after Hicklin, obscene
materials were not only considered outrageous and injurious to
social mores but also explicitly calculated to corrupt morals.
Juries were entrapped by the prospect that published materials
were both morally harmful and socially beneficial, which opened
the legal regime to a wide range of reasoning and moral
arguments from all sides. Prior to Hicklin, this would have been
impossible because the harm was general and societal and, by
definition, admitted no counterclaim. After Hicklin, however, the
harm was more focused on individuals most susceptible as well as
the mitigation of potential harm by potential benefit to others.
V.

ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION IN AMERICAN LAW

Even within English common law, the precedential value of
Hicklin is a complicated calculation. As a case at common law, we
would assume it reflected legal reasoning from established and
self-standing principles regarding libel law. To the degree that
Hicklin was governed by precedent, its reasoning would have been
directed more by the broad legal principles reflected in previous
similar cases than by the specific decisions of those cases or their
particular circumstances.
In that sense, Cockburn's decision
would have been a reflection of both principles of standard
criminal libel law and the kinds of contemporary moral balancing
one might expect in an area of unsettled common law. In the
latter, one must also assume that Cockburn was attempting to
adapt the dictates of traditional libel law to what appeared to be
added statutory authority from language and intent of the
Obscene Publications Act of 1857. However, it quickly became
apparent that the Act contributed no authority to obscene libel
law, throwing the Court back onto the practices of existing
common law, albeit with the added burden of open jury
consideration of defendant motive, an element authorized by Fox's
Libel Law over a century earlier."
88. Both the language and the reasoning of Hicklin continues to pervade
obscenity case law in England and provided the basis for the first effort at
statutory definition in the 1959 Obscene Publications Act which was designed
to supersede the common law crime of obscene libel and replace the provisions
of the 1857 Act. Specifically, the Act defines (in section 1) a published article
as obscene "if its effect ...is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave
and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant
circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it"
and yet could be justified (Section 4) "as being for the public good on the
ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of
other objects of general concern" that could be discerned by admitting as
evidence "the opinion of experts as to the literary, artistic, scientific or other
merits. . . ."Obscene Publications Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. c. 66, § 1, 4 (1960).
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Fundamentally, the basic regimes of the criminal law of
obscene libel were established prior to Hicklin, as the common law
stretched to redefine moral offenses such as blasphemy and
sedition as temporal concerns. Hicklin paid due notice to and
faithfully reflected their guiding principles, especially regarding
the nature of libel as publication and the degree to which
consideration of the resulting public harm was governing by
assumptions regarding both tendency and intention. Moreover,
these regimes were affected by and reflected cultural dynamics in
England during the first half of the nineteenth century,
specifically, but not confined to, the democratization of culture, the
rise of mass literacy and mass modes of communication, and the
secularization of moral values which, by mid-century, were defined
more by dominant, retrenching cultural mores rather than by
established religion.
This environment shifted questions of
obscene libel away from challenges to religious doctrine and solidly
into the realm of cultural outrage, particularly in literature and
art. However, despite the apparent contradictions among the
demands of evidence and considerations of motive, Hicklin
demonstrated that the crime of obscene libel remained one of
perpetuating general moral harm against society by permanent
contribution to public discourse - contra bonos mores.
This remained the central consideration when Hicklin was
adopted as precedent in American law in United States v.
Bennett.89 In that case, D.M. Bennett was arrested under the
Comstock Act ° for selling copies of Ezra Heywood's free love
89. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1104-05.
90. 17 Stat. 598, 598-99 (1873). In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732
(1877), the Court held that Congress was empowered to refuse the use of U.S.
mails to distribute matter "injurious to the public morals" under the Comstock
Act of 1873, 17 Stat. 598, but that case involved lottery tickets rather than
obscene publications, the latter having more direct free speech implications. A
diverse range of obscene libel cases was tried at the state level prior to
Bennett, including Knowles, 3 Day 103 (exhibition of a picture of a monster
outrages decency); New York v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (1811) (malicious
blasphemy corrupts morals, including 'the tender morals of the young', and
destroys order guaranteed by the sanctions of moral and social obligation, and
is an abuse of liberty); Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (display of an obscene
painting an immoral act under common law as it corrupts morals); Holmes, 17
Mass. 335 (offensive prints published in a book corrupts morals and
constitutes a crime under common law); United States v. Brooks, 24 F. Cas.
1244 (D.C. 1834) (cursing in a public meeting an offense against public
morality); Commonwealth v. Tarbox, 55 Mass. 66, 66 (1848) (distribution of
papers "manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of the young"); and
Anonymous, 1 F. Cas. 1024 (1865) (importation of "fancy boxes" too indelicate
for family use and hence unfit for entering the community). See generally
Donna Dennis, Obscenity Law and Its Consequences in Mid-Nineteenth
Century America, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 45 (2007) (examining the history
of obscenity prosecutions and their role in creating the American pornography
industry).
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pamphlet Cupid's Yoke through the U.S. mail.9' In federal district
court, the jury was charged with determining not whether the
materials could corrupt the minds of the jury or every person, but
rather "whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and
corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open to such
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall... in the young and inexperienced... tending to suggest
impure and libidinous thoughts." 9
Further specification of how to discern such matter was not
offered because it was presumed to be within the reasonable
judgment of intelligent men, and the jury was asked to focus more
particularly on "whether they incite impure desires in the minds of
the boys and girls or other persons who are susceptible to such
impure thoughts and desires ... [and] whether it is of dangerous
tendency in the community generally, or any considerable portion
of that community."92

91. Bennett had in fact been indicted before for selling the pamphlet by
mail but the case was dismissed because of concerns that the pamphlet raised
moral issues (perhaps of concern as blasphemous libel) and contained little
sexual description that would bring it directly under the Comstock Act.
Bennett, editor of the Truth Seeker and a member of the National Defense
Association, a freethinker group dedicated to constitutional defense of those
prosecuted under the Comstock Act, pressed the point by advertising the
availability of the pamphlet in his newspaper, to which Comstock covertly
responded and purchased a copy, precipitating Bennett's second arrest. See
generally DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOrTEN YEARS, 1870-1920
23-41 (Cambridge 1997); HELEN HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES OVER
SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPRESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
419-436 (Knopf 2002); and RODERICK BRADFORD, D. M. BENNETT: THE TRUTH

SEEKER (Prometheus Books 2006).
92. As cited in the circuit court decision Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1102. The
record of the district court trial is contained in the circuit court decision and
its transcript published as TRIAL OF D. M. BENNETT IN THE UNITED STATES

CIRCUIT COURT by the Truth Seeker Office (1879), reprinted in (Leonard W.
Levy, ed., De Capo Press 1973).
93. Id. at 1105. The Bennett jury was provided with full copies of Cupid's
Yoke with the challenged passages marked but not set forth in haec verba
(specific words) in the indictment, consistent with Holmes, 17 Mass. 335
(material too obscene to be included in the court record); Tarbox, 55 Mass. 66
(substance of the material described but not the actual language); Sharpless, 2
Serg. & Rawle 91 (obscene picture not described in detail); People v. Girardin,
1 Mich. 90, 91 (1848) (publication in the court record perpetuates the initial
crime); Commonwealth v. McCance, 164 Mass. 162 (1895); People v. Kaufman,
43 N.Y.S. 1046 (1897). However, the jury was instructed to consider the
obscenity (and tendency) of the passages marked and not the general scope of
the pamphlet. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1102. As directed in Commonwealth v.
Buckley, 200 Mass. 346 (1909), the accepted practice in American law was that
the challenged material need not be placed in the court record since the jury,
charged with judging the material's degree of criminality, had already seen
the material in its entirety.

20081

Roth at Fifty

Upheld at the appellate level,94 Bennett established the socalled Hicklin test - reduced to a determination of the tendency of
the challenged matter to deprave and corrupt the minds of those
susceptible to that influence and into whose hands it may fall - as
the prevailing legal standard for adjudging obscenity in criminal
actions under state and federal laws for the next thirty years."
This standard was challenged only intermittently to reflect
concerns that rigid adherence would radically restrict public
access to bona fide literary and artistic works.' Despite its direct
adoption of English common law language of tendency and
inferred intent,97 the Bennett decision was not particularly lucid in
establishing a definitive legal standard. This decision's lack of
clarity may have been in large part be due to its reliance on
Starkie's treatise 9 for statements of controlling precedent in
English common law rather than a careful reading of Hicklin, the
libel case law on which it was based, and the evolution of its legal
context." The precedential value of Hicklin was further confused
by its careless adoption a decade later in Muller, which juxtaposed
traditional common law notions of intent with motive when it
stated:
We think it would also be a proper test of obscenity ... is whether
the motive of the painting or statue ... as indicated by it ... is pure

or impure, whether it is naturally calculated to excite in a spectator
impure imaginations, and whether the other incidents and qualities,

94. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1102.
95. People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884), replicated almost verbatim in
Clarke, 38 F. at 733-734.
96. See, e.g., In re Worthington Co., 30 N.Y.S. 361 (1894) (world renowned
classics cannot be regarded as specimens of pornographic literature); see also
St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 118 N.Y.S. 582 (1909) ("the object of the law which
prohibits the sale or publication of immoral literature is to prevent the
circulation of literature which is hurtful to the community" and not works
"promoting justice and humanity and the reign of reason in public affairs,"
such as Voltaire). On numerous occasions and most prominently in the
appellate decision in United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705

(2d Cir. 1934), affg 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) [hereinafter Ulysses III,
courts rejected the Hicklin precedent because it was seen as precluding
consideration of intent qua motive or because it relied solely on isolated
passages rather than admitting the matter as a whole, neither position being a
particularly accurate reading of Hicklin in legal context.
97. Consistent with English common law assumptions regarding intent, the
Court in Bennett found that obscene matter was "calculated to produce a
pernicious effect, in depraving and debauching the minds of persons into
whose hands it might come," regardless of the defendant's ulterior motive, 24
F. Cas. at 1099-1100, 1104 (citing both Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 371, and Steele
v. Brennan, 7 L.P.C.P. 261).
98. STARKIE, supra note 31.
99. See HOROWITZ, supra note 92, at 192 (noting that courts, such as the
Bennett Court, relied on treatises to ascertain common law traditions in trials

involving libel and obscenity).
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however attractive, were merely accessory to this as the primary or
main purposes of the representation. 100
The "rejection" of the Hicklin test, presaged in United States
v. Kennerley,1 ' came in the 1930s as courts began to openly give
heavier weight to considerations of the social value of the
challenged material. In United States v. Dennett'O° the Court
found that a pamphlet mailed to a married woman for the purpose
of proper sex education of her children was within the obscenity
statute's intent to protect children, and although the material in
the pamphlet might arouse lustful thoughts in some, the language,
tone, and content was dignified and calculated to eliminate
0
ignorance and curiosity."
The last vestige of the more restrictive
societal
balance
identified
with
the Hicklin test was
Commonwealth v. Friede° 4 which focused on selected passages of
Theodore Dreiser's American Tragedy.
Even though these
passages were argued to be an important literary work, they were
still found to be criminally obscene.'
In Ulysses," Judge Woolsey's impassioned defense of the
work's literary value in context," 7 paralleling Talfourd's defense of
Shelley in Moxon,"8 became the clarion call for a more balanced
weighting of imputed dangers and compensating social benefit.
Accepting Woolsey's argument at the appellate level, Justice
Augustus Hand read Hicklin as ignoring the potential social and
literary value of the challenged matter in its insistence on
considering isolated passages out of context and judging the
tendency entirely on the anticipated effect of those passages on the
minds of the individuals most susceptible and scolded Moxon for
its narrow view of the value of literature in society. Instead,
following Woolsey, the Court found that Ulysses was "a book of
originality and sincerity of treatment" (akin to the tone and
character arguments in blasphemous libel cases) and "has not the
effect of promoting lust.""°
100. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 411.
101. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). While following Hicklin precedent in
Kennerley, Learned Hand forcefully lamented that the standard had the effect
of "reduc[ing] our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library in the
supposed interest of the salacious few ....
" reflecting the historical concern of
legal overbalance in favor of restrictiveness at the expense of the
dissemination of knowledge. Id. at 121.
102. 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
103. Id. at 568-69.
104. 271 Mass. 318 (1930).
105. Id. at 322. The Friede decision precipitated changes in Massachusetts
obscenity statutes. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 4, at 327.
106. Ulysses 1, 5 F. Supp. 182.
107. See id. (detailing Judge Woosley's determination on having the work
read in context).
108. Moxon, 4 St. Trials (N.S.) at 699-722.
109. Ulysses 11, 72 F.2d at 708.
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A fair reading of Hicklin in its legal context might rather
conclude that tendency was to be considered in the prevailing
balance of factors called for at common law at that time, a balance
that emphasized individual responsibility to avoid negative
consequences on society regardless of ulterior beneficial objectives.
It would be inaccurate to conclude that consideration of positive
societal benefits could not be argued in obscene libel cases under
common law because, in many precedent cases, societal benefit
was in some measure argued even though in most cases it was
found to be insufficient to overcome at sentencing what was, under
common law, a relatively automatic finding that obscene matter by
More accurately,
definition tended to deprave and corrupt.
Hicklin became a bellwether for the issue of the proper balance of
relevant factors because the Recorder's decision took into account
evidence of the defendant's personal intent as contradicting the
presumption of "calculated tendency," an argument successfully
pursued in Moxon" ° and, arguably, in Bradlaugh and Besant."'
Over time, responding to changes in cultural mores, courts in both
England and the United States began to progressively give greater
compensatory weight to the potential positive effect of the
challenged matter, especially in cases of scientific, literary,
artistic, or educational content, particularly when the portrayed
danger to the populous, or vulnerable subgroups within it, was
assumed rather than evidenced.
VI. CONCLUSION

As precedent in American obscenity doctrine, Hicklin
continues to reflect all of the fundamental elements currently
debated in contemporary American obscenity doctrine and
demonstrates that it is impossible to disintegrate these elements
without losing the common understanding of what constitutes the
basic reasoning behind obscenity law. Brennan's assertion that
the Hicklin test was flawed because it did not allow consideration
of the materials as a whole is not only misleading (because it was
not even part of the reasoning of the Cockburn decision) but also
misses the point altogether that consideration of materials in
context - either as isolated passages within the context of the
whole publication or as the publication itself in the context of the
defendant's motivation - was not unusual practice at common law
prior to Hicklin.
110. See Moxon, 4 St. Trials (N.S.) at 693 (detailing the indictment against
Moxon, which serves as an indication that the calculated tendency argument

was adopted).
111. (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 607.

112. In this sense, the continuous argument over whether the challenged
matter should be read into the record, a staple of many blasphemous libel
cases in the nineteenth century such as Richard Carlile, 109 Eng. Rep. 1177,
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In Roth, we did not finally overcome Hicklin in the sense that
contextual factors could now be considered by the court or the jury.
Rather, what we have seen is a relative shifting in the weighting
of contextual factors in an area of unsettled law. Why would we
want to consider "the work as a whole" anyway? Is this simply an
attempt to give fair hearing to the author or artist, whose motives
have always been ancillary to the potential effect of the work in
question, or are we truly interested in gauging the effect of the
work, assuming the whole work is consumed as the context for any
interpretation of how it may influence the way consumers think or
behave in consequence?113 In fact, in the context of common law
regimes, it has been and would be reasonable to consider "the
work as a whole" in evidence of either tendency (effect) or intent
(motive), especially to the degree that they are interdependent
factors. As a relevant factor, any focus on the issue of isolated
passages only reflects the degree of statutory discretion granted by
obscenity law to magistrates or local police which, by the
experience of the 1857 Act, inevitably becomes arbitrary and
perhaps even capricious in an area of unsettled law.
Brennan's argument that the Hicklin test, in its focus on the
"most susceptible minds" as a synonym for "youth," was overinclusive, potentially reducing (as contemporary courts have
chided) the national literature to the library of a fourteen-year-old,
a concern raised in the Parliamentary debate over Lord
Campbell's Act in 1857. Contextual factors were balanced as part
of the legal regime during the time of Hicklin and continue today
to be the focus of debates over moralistic paternalism or the
imminence of permanent societal dangers from some quarters,
especially in the area of child pornography. It is too easy to simply
say that Hicklin was wrongly decided, or that its test is arcane or
is a different issue altogether. This is settled in libel law more as an issue of
repeating the libel (as a second publication and thereby exacerbating the
injury to persons or society in general) and less of 'polluting the record' with
vulgar language.
113. Because American obscenity doctrine began with the Hicklin
presumption that obscene materials deprave and corrupt the minds of those
susceptible to that influence, the recurring quandary presented in assessment
of the consequences of the publication (public availability) of such materials is

whether Cockburn was referring to its influence on an individual's thoughts,

an individual's basic norms (ideology), an individual's subsequent behavior, or
on society's overall commitment to civility and social order, and in application,
whether sufficient danger to the public welfare is produced by this causal
relationship to warrant state regulation by statute. See, e.g., Lockhart and
McClure, supra note 4, at 329-42; Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and
Law: Pornography,Blasphemy, and the FirstAmendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297
(1988). See generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW. VOL. 2, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (Oxford 1985) (discussing the conflict

between the focus on the individual and the individual's actions versus
society's overall interest).
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inappropriate, as found in Roth. As a case in common law, Hicklin
reflects an amalgam of fundamental principles and prior reasoning
regarding obscene libel and still instructs us as to the basic
parameters of issues in obscenity law today.

